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I. INTRODUCTION 
Iraq was hopeful when it imagined preparing itself as an 
"investment cake" under the new Investment Law. Following 
investment environment reforms, 1 Iraq opened the doors of its economy 
to foreign investors. 2 However, as some foreign investors flowed in and 
commenced "eating" the cake, they were disappointed to find it sugar-
free, not sweet and sugary as most would prefer. 3 What then would be 
1. See SAMI SHUBBER, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT IN IRAQ 5-6 (2009). 
2. Iraq has made significant progress in the reconstruction of its economy, and 
investors have shown considerable interest in the country, as evidenced by the influx of 
Chinese investors in the past few years. In fact, recent statistics show that the number of 
foreign investments doubled in 2010, as investors swarmed into the Middle Eastern country 
to cash in on investment opportunities arising from Iraq's stabilitiy. More positive results 
are being reported by western news agencies, as evidenced by Newsweek International's 
(London) following assertion: "Civil war or not, Iraq has an economy, and- mother of all 
surprises- it's doing remarkably well. Real estate is booming. Construction, retail and 
wholesale trade sectors are healthy, too, report by Global Insight in London. The U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce reports 34,000 registered companies in Iraq, up from 8,000 three 
years ago. Sales of second-hand cars, televisions and mobile phones have all risen sharply. 
Estimates vary, but one from Global Insight puts GDP growth at 17 percent last year and 
projects 13 percent for 2006. The World Bank has it lower: at 4 percent this year. But, given 
all the attention paid to deteriorating security, the startling fact is that, Iraq is growing at 
all." See generally WORLD BANK, MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION, REBUILDING 
IRAQ: ECONOMIC REFORM AND TRANSITION (2006). 
3. Considering the investment needs in Iraq, investment opportunities are myriad 
across sectors in the Iraqi economy. In this respect, the Iraqi Government has availed 
investment opportunities across sectors including construction, industry, agriculture, 
tourism, housing, communications, and health care. Leading investment companies still 
have a tendency to invest in the energy sector, particularly as proven by the fact that Iraqi 
reserves of oil stand at 115 billion barrels. On the basis of these figures, Iraq ranks 2- 3 
worldwide with the largest proven amount of reserves. There are also indications that Iraq 
has 45- 100 billion additional barrels in its western desert, which remain undiscovered. 
Furthermore, Iraq's discovered oil reserves amount to 10% of the world's total reserves. 
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the result? 
Certainly, other investors would receive a "warning" notice that 
the Iraqi "cake" was not only free of sugar, but also salty. The following 
question would be raised here regarding the multi-white-powder cakes 
in a warehouse: which of them has sugar? 
The thesis of this article is that ten years of Iraqi and international 
efforts4 to encourage foreign investment have failed and that foreign 
investment in Iraq remains limited to the extent of foreign investment 
flows amounting to USD 1. 617 billion, as of 2011. 5 
The path to investing in Iraq is still full of obstacles because 
reforms have not been addressed. For example, a number of old laws do 
not meet minimum international standards, yet they remain in force. 
Moreover, national infrastructure is not up to acceptable standards, and 
foreign investors must comply with administrative red tape. Despite 
other recently emerging challenges, as described by this article's 
analysis below, 6 some writers argue that there are sufficient existing 
justifications for foreign investors to come to Iraq and initiate a 
harvesting of dividends. 7 
Iraq has natural gas ("NG") reserves as well. Available information indicates 112 trillion 
cubic feet NG reserves in Iraq, thus placing Iraq at the tenth position worldwide in terms of 
largest NG reserves. Potentially, additional NG reserves amount to 275- 300 trillion cubic 
feet along with large amounts of other metals including phosphate, sulphur, and iron. See 
Top Ten Reason to Invest in Iraq, REPUBLIC OF IRAQ NATIONAL INVESTMENT COMMISSION, 
available at http://investpromo.gov.iq/why-iraq/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). 
4. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, SUPPORTING 
INVESTMENT POLICY AND GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN IRAQ 8 (2010). The Iraqi Government is 
at the forefront in spearheading reconstruction efforts in Iraq, but support is being provided 
by other investment partners such as the U.S. through the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 
which is also channeling funds toward improving reconstruction efforts in Iraq. Id. 
5. UNCTAD, WORLDINVESTMENTREPORTUNITEDNATIONS 171 (2012). 
6. See generally Clarence M. Dass, Adventure Capitalizing in Baghdad: An 
Entrepreneurial Approach to Reconstructing Iraq, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 157 
(2010); Ned Parker, The Iraq We Left Behind: Welcome to the World's Next Failed State, 91 
FOREIGN AFF. 94 (2012); Antony Blinken, Is Iraq on Track? Democracy and Disorder in 
Baghdad, 91 FOREIGN AFF. 152 (2012); Christopher J. Coyne & Adam Pellillo, Economic 
Reconstruction Amidst Conflict: Insights from Afghanistan and Iraq, 22 DEF. & PEACE 
ECON. 627 (2011); CHRISTOPHER J. COYNE, The Economic Reconstruction of Iraq (2010), 
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 1550867 (last visited Oct. 
30, 2013). 
7. David Grantham argues that the calculation of profits outweigh risks for foreign 
investment companies in Iraq. See David Brent Grantham, Calculated Risk: The Advance of 
IOCs and NOCs Into the Iraqi Investment Theater, 3 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & Bus. 315 
(2010) [hereinafter Grantham, Calculated Risk]; See generally Judith Richards Hope & 
Edward N. Griffin, The New Iraq: Revising Iraq 's Commercial Law is a Necessity for 
Foreign Direct Investment and the Reconstruction of Iraq's Decimated Economy, 11 
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These opinions rely on a drastic change in the country's political, 
legal, and economic arenas, with new facts being formulated after the 
Anglo-American troops toppled the then-ruling Baathist Regime. 
Thereafter, the new Iraqi Government sought to rebuild the country's 
war-tom economy by opening its doors to investors. Iraq has moved 
from a central to an open-market economy. To enable this shift, a 
number of laws were enacted;8 Investment Law No. 13 of 2006 is the 
most notable of these new laws. The law provides for guarantees 
together with prohibition of nationalization and confiscation, adoption 
of stable legislation, and provision of international arbitration as 
mechanisms of dispute settlement. A host of incentives and exemptions 
have been provided for by this law, the most important of which is the 
ten year tax free period for investments. 9 
The reconstruction efforts are one reason why international 
investors are storming into Iraq. It is estimated that Iraq's reconstruction 
efforts are going to cost about USD 100 billion. 10 International 
companies are coming into Iraq to acquire a share of the finances. 
Another reason for such a notion is the amount of support Iraq is 
receiving from international organizations and governments. Since 
2003, Iraq has been a recipient of aid both in technical and legislative 
know-how from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD). Political developments in the country are seen 
as remarkable progress in that MENA-OECD deemed it necessary to 
help hold competitive elections as part of the democratic transition. 
CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 875 (2004); Robert D. Tadlock, Occupation Law and Foreign 
Investment in Iraq: How an Outdated Doctrine has Become an Obstacle to Occupied 
Populations, 39 U.S.F. L. Rev. 227 (2005). The title of David Grantham's previous article 
was Caveat Investor: Assessing the Risks and Rewards of IOCs Entry into Iraq, which won 
the Spring 2009 AIPN Student Writing Competition. See David Brent Grantham, Caveat 
Investor: Assessing the Risks and Rewards of IOCs Entry Into Iraq, 3 J. WORLD ENERGY L. 
& Bus. 304 (2010). 
8. One of these was the "Foreign Investment Order." This legislation, which was part 
of the 100 orders issued by the former U.S. civilian administrator Paul Bremer when he was 
head of the Coalition Provisional Authority ("CPA") during the first year of occupation, has 
provided U.S. groups with a multitude of benefits: full repatriation of profits earned in Iraq 
by foreign companies, sale of all Iraqi companies to foreign groups including banks, 
privatization of the entire Iraqi public sector, total legal immunity for occupants and their 
subcontractors in Iraq, and "national treatment" of foreign investments. See Order No. 39 
Foreign Investment, THE IRAQ COALITION (Dec. 20, 2003), available at 
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20031220 _ CP AORD _ 39 _Foreign_ Investment_. pd 
f (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). 
9. See SHUBBER, supra note 1, at 5. 
10. James Glanz & T. Christian Miller, Official History Spotlights Iraq Rebuilding 
Blunders, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2008, at Al. 
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However, Iraq's political and economic environments are still seen as 
challenges for its government, and will need to be dealt with in the 
years ahead. At the international conference concerning developments 
in Iraq, the representatives of the International Compact with Iraq (ICI) 
recognized the importance of reforms that are required to be supported 
by the MENA-OECD: noting that refors should center on governance 
and investment for development. Structural reforms such as promoting 
sector development, attracting foreign investment, and good governance 
were presented at this gathering. According to the representatives, all 
these aspects affect a country's business environment. 11 
The author argues that such a reform is a white point on a grey 
board, but is still insufficient for the revival of the investment 
environment. Unfortunately, the Iraqi investment environment has been 
shaken to the roots by political rifts at the borders, where the volcano of 
terrorism has erupted. The consequent corruption has taken its toll. 
Furthermore, the weak investment-related legal system can be ascribed 
to a lack of effective protection of intellectual property rights, the 
indefinite role of national investment authorities, and the extreme 
ineffectiveness ( even lack) of an independent and efficient judiciary. 
This article concludes that there are certain reforms that may 
alleviate these obstacles and establish a sustainable investment-friendly 
environment so that Iraq may move forward. 
The rest of this article consists of five parts: the first part analyzes 
the endemic obstacles in the country; the second part tests the efficiency 
of the Iraqi legal system; the third part reveals that the country's 
investment frameworks are inhibitory; the fourth part demonstrates that 
legal determinants still exist in the investment environment; the fifth 
part presents a roadmap for the reform of the investment environment in 
Iraq. 
II. ANALYSIS OF INHERENT LIMITATIONS 
Even though Iraq is a country rich in investment opportunities, 
investors have expressed concerns over the feasibility of investing 
money in Iraq and obtaining negative returns. The causes of investors' 
fears include political conflicts, insecurity, corruption, and poor 
infrastructure. 
11. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4, 
at 14, 34. 
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A. Political Conflict and Security Collapse 
On December 19, 2011, Iraqis woke to receive the news that Vice 
President, Tareq al-Hashemi, had been arrested on charges of running a 
terrorist group. 12 This story caused further damage to the deteriorating 
political, legal, and security situation in the country, sending a bleak 
message to potential investors. 13 Upon analysis, it was determined that 
the worst part of the situation was that it reflected a negative political 
environment. If the charges against the Iraqi Vice-President, who was 
accused of harboring terrorists, were proven in the absence of any fierce 
political competition, this would be a clear indication that terrorists held 
a strong foothold in the Iraqi Government. However, if the charges were 
proven false, the case would reflect the exclusion mechanism adopted 
by politicians on one hand, and the lack of independence of 
investigative authorities and the judiciary represented by the court that 
sentenced Al-Hashemi to death on the other. 14 This led to massive 
political and legal issues. The asylum sought by Al-Hashemi in 
Kurdistan and his stay therein under the protection of the Kurdistan 
forces despite the arrest warrant against him was followed by the 
reluctance of the Kurdistan Police to enforce the Baghdad court arrest 
orders; the role of the Kurdistan Police in denying the Federal Police 
admittance into Iraqi Kurdistan to enforce the arrest warrant is also 
significant. 15 Such developments resulted in a big question over the 
administrative and legal powers of the Kurdistan region, leaving the 
Iraqi Constitution in a dilemma regarding the regulation and 
administrative organization of the state. 16 This scene is but a reflection 
12. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, REPORT No. 126, DEJA vu ALL OVER AGAIN? 
IRAQ'S ESCALATING POLITICAL CRISIS (2012), available at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Afiica/Iraq%20Syr 
ia%20Lebanon/Iraq/126-deja-vu-all-over-again-iraqs-escalating-political-crisis.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2013). 
13. See Blinken, supra note 6 at 155 
14. On September 9, 2012, the Iraqi Central Criminal Court sentenced Vice President 
Tareq al-Hashemi to death after he was convicted on charges of managing terrorist death 
squads. See The Judicial Authority, TRANSLITERATED ARABIC TITLE [JUDGMENT TO DEATH 
BY SUPREME JUDICIAL COUNCIL] (2012), available at http://www.iraqja.iq/view.1677 I (last 
visited Nov. 5, 2013); Michael A. Newton, The Death Penalty and the Iraqi Transition: 
Observations on a Lost Opportunity (Vanderbilt Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-45, 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2191144## (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). 
15. See Iraq VP Tariq al-Hashemi Sentenced to Death, BBC NEWS (Sept. 9, 2012), 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19537301 (last visited Nov. 5, 
2013). 
16. Most of the political and administrative problems are due to the failing constitution 
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of a failed state, where the absence of law and infesting corruption and 
brutality are the rule. Political leaders use security forces and militias to 
suppress enemies and intimidate the public with an inclination to settle 
scores with opponents by means of timed bombs and silencer guns on 
streets. 17 There are large-scale accusations against the government and 
ruling parties of protecting and harboring criminals and corrupt 
individuals on one hand and liquidating supervisory and judicial bodies 
that hinder illegal activities on the other. 18 Clearly, the Iraqi 
Government has proven itself unable to provide basic services such as 
electricity, clean water, and appropriate healthcare to the public. 
Unemployment among youths amounts to 30%; thus, they are easy prey 
for terrorist groups. 19 Consequently, Iraq does not exhibit the stability 
sought by foreign companies which has a negative impact on its efforts 
to attract investors. 20 
The post-2003 political conflicts in Iraq resulted in a fragile 
security environment; 1 however, such fragility has existed in Iraq over 
the last four decades owing to wars fought by Iraq and its consequent 
political seclusion, as manifested by the investor repellent siege. 
However, the governments in existence during those times endeavored 
to enact pro-investment laws to attract investors into Iraq. This effort 
failed because of the then unstable political and security situations, and 
the presence of a pessimistic outlook. 22 This led to the failure of 
in terms of the sought-after crystal clear administrative federal or decentralized 
organization. The ambiguous constitutional provisions regarding the regulation of powers 
between the central and province governments on one hand, and the overlap of powers on 
the other, contributed to creating one of the most complex problems that resulted in the 
conflict between the Central Government, Kurdistan Region and the Region-free 
Governorates. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Notes in Defense of the Iraq Consitution, 33 U. PA. 
J. INT'L L. 1277 (2012); Christina J. Sheetz & Matthew T. Simpson, Symposium: Rethinking 
the Future: The Next Five Years in Iraq, 24 AM. U. INT'L L. Rev. 181 (2009). 
17. See Parker, supra note 6. 
18. See Blinken, supra note 6, at 152-53. 
19. See Parker, supra note 6, at 94 
20. See Dass, supra note 6, at 157, 161-62. 
21. See James P. Pfiffner, U.S. Blunders in Iraq: De-Baathification and Disbanding the 
Army, 25 INTELLIGENCE & NAT'L SECURITY 76, 76-85 (2010). The dissolution of the Iraqi 
army and security departments by the former Civil Administrator of Iraq, Paul Bremer, and 
his substitution with militias of the ruling parties contributed to the insecurity. This led to 
large-scale corruption in granting military positions to persons who lacked basic police or 
military training. The political rampage has been further compounded by sacking thousands 
of civil servants who once were members of the banned Baath Party. For the same political 
reasons (i.e., membership of the Baath Party), some opponents were banned from having a 
say in the political process. Id. 
22. See Dass, supra note 6, at 159-60. 
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attracting in-bound investments and out-bound departure of local 
capital.23 By 2005, the political situation improved following the 
adoption of the new constitution and the completion of the first free 
elections, thus marking a better political situation and a future 
democratic outlook. Another positive point was the significantly 
improving security situation. 24 
Contrary to expectations, the political and security situation in Iraq 
only worsened, with serious setbacks taking place to initiate an 
unending series of daily terrorist acts since mid-2006. As for investors, 
deliberate assassinations, kidnappings, bombings, and threats against 
individuals and corporations alike have created an enormous obstacle to 
in-bound investments. Political instability and insecurity are the main 
reasons behind foreign companies and local capital leaving Iraq. 25 
In 2009, under a political truce, the number of terrorist attacks 
reduced owing to hunting down of armed militias under the "law 
enforcement" operation. Following the formation of the national 
partnership government, which involved parties from across the Iraqi 
political spectrum, the investment environment improved slightly, with 
numerous Turkish, Chinese, and Iranian companies engaging in 
business activities of various natures, particularly in the housing 
industry. 26 
Despite the aforementioned progress, the Iraqi investment 
environment remained incapable of attracting and retaining major 
foreign companies. At the time, foreign investors were uncertain about 
the long term stability of Iraq's investment climate.27 Fleeing from 
investments in Iraq is justifiable; the political congestion between 
Baghdad and Irbil has generated problems that have reflected on the 
operations of oil companies. 28 Relations between investment-hosting 
and parent states have gained importance in Iraq's case, as the strained 
Baghdad-Ankara29 political relations have had a toll on Turkish 
23. See generally Stephen Biddle, Michael E. O'Hanlon & Kenneth M. Pollack, How 
to Leave a Stable Iraq, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 40, 52-53 (2008). 
24. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 4, 
at 14. 
25. See Dass, supra note 6, at 161-62. 
26. See WORLD BANK, MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA REGION, supra note 2, at 27, 
44. 
27. See Grantham, Calculated Risk, supra note 7, at 315, 319-20. 
28. See REX J. ZEDALIS, THE LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF OIL AND NATURAL GAS IN IRAQ: 
CURRENT REALITY AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 317, 319 (2009). 
29. Baghdad- Ankara relations are experiencing tension because of a number of 
differences; recently, Turkey refused to extradite the fugitive Iraqi Vice-President Al-
9
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companies' Iraq-based operations.30 The security of Turkish investors is 
related to Iraq's inter-country political disputes. 
Broadly speaking, the partial stability of given areas in an 
investment region does not lead to astonishing results. Although the 
southern and northern parts of Iraq enjoy reasonable security, the 
creation of a healthy and attractive environment requires more stability 
across Iraq. 31 Foreign direct investments are long-term by nature, and 
hence, investors are interested in the political and security situation 
across the whole of a country, rather than just parts of it. 32 Therefore, 
insecurity is a hindrance to foreign private investment as it results in 
higher security and protection costs for investments, and transport. A 
number of opinions stress that such investment companies sometimes 
use security or military companies to overcome the insecurity 
dilemma.33 Moreover, some sectors such as the oil sector will be a target 
for foreign companies for two reasons: (1) the global strategic 
importance of this sector, which promotes the protection of such 
companies, and (2) the high returns that motivate a high-risk approach.34 
Hashemi in addition to accusations brought by Al-Maliki's government against Erdogan of 
dealing with Kurdistan as an independent state last August, following the Turkish Foreign 
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's visit to Kirkuk without notifying the Federal Government, 
which irked the latter. Earlier, Erdogan accused his Iraqi counterpart of power monopoly. In 
response, Al-Makili accused Turkey of causing chaos in the region by meddling in the 
internal affairs of neighboring countries, including Iraq and Syria. See Iraq Warns Turkey 
over Kurdistan Pipeline Deal, BBC NEWS (May 22, 2012), available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18163248 (last visited Nov. 6, 2013). 
30. Hundreds of Iraqi demonstrators burnt the Turkish flag and threatened Turkish 
interests in Iraq on the backdrop of Turkey's interference with Iraqi affairs and violation of 
Iraqi sovereignty. Turkey, Iraq Condemn "Shameful Behavior" Against Flag in Basra 
Protest, TODAYS ZAMAN (May 20, 2012), available at http://www.todayszaman.com/news-
280891-turkey-iraq-condemn-shameful-behavior-against-tlag-in-basra-protest.html (last 
visited Nov. 6, 2013). 
31. Dass, supra note 6, at 157. 
32. SURYA P. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW RECONCILING POLICY AND 
PRINCIPLE 16 (2008). 
33. Alberto Abadie & Javier Gardeazabal, Terrorism and the World Economy, 52 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 1 (2008). 
34. This can be seen in Colombia, where foreign companies were reluctant to enter the 
Colombian market. Opposition groups used to blow up the pipelines of foreign oil 
companies, but the latter managed to wipe out such opposition groups by offering huge 
financial support to the Colombian Government with a view to securing their interests. The 
same holds true for the companies that operated in Afghanistan before toppling, as they 
concluded many agreements with the Government since 1996. These foreign companies 
offered large amounts to the Taliban Government. When Unocal was told that Taliban is a 
regressive terrorist movement, UNOCAL spokesman Mike Thatcher said, "We're an oil and 
gas company. We go where the oil and gas is." This makes sense because large companies 
10
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Iraq is going through difficult times, mainly because of sectarian 
and racial divisions that have never been as deeply felt or expressed as 
they are now.35 The country's foreseeable future holds no indication of 
the settlement of rampant disputes that have taken place between 
warring parties since the last parliamentary elections. 36 All political 
efforts did not lead to any solution; the appointment of the two ministers 
of defense and interior is far from settled, 37 the council of strategic 
policies has never come to light, and the dispute between Baghdad and 
Irbil about Kirkuk and other disputed regions remains intact. 38 
Moreover, acting on the Oil and Gas Law is still of no interest to 
politicians. Meanwhile, the Federal Government and Government of 
Kurdistan are still at war regarding the endorsement of oil agreements 
with several oil companies created without the federal government's 
review or consent. The Constitution39 remains as it is despite its 
ambiguities. No census has been executed. There are a large number of 
political blocs, especially those represented in the House of 
Representatives, on top of conflicts that affected the overall situation of 
the State. 
In a serious evaluation of political and sectarian conflicts, 
grassroots uprising in Iraqi cities, particularly Ramadi and Salahuddin, 
use specialist security companies for protection. This applies to the Iraqi economy, where 
oil resources are outside city boundaries, thus making protection and capital retention easy. 
See Wayne Madsen, Afghanistan, the Taliban and the Bush Oil Team, GLOBAL RESEARCH 
(Jan. 23, 2002), available at http://globalresearch.ca/articles/MAD201A.html (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2013). 
35. One of the reasons behind sectarian volatilization has been the Iraq-based U.S. 
Forces; the Sunnis, Shiites, and Kurds deal with the U.S. forces differently. The first fought 
U.S. Forces, while the second cooperated with them to establish the foundations of the 
nascent state, but for U.S. Forces exiting Iraq afterwards. However, the Sunnis felt insecure 
about U.S. Forces leaving the country. See Bart S. Fisher, Symposium: Markets in 
Transition: Reconstruction and Development: Part One - Reconstruction: Prescriptions for 
Iraq, Predictions for Russia and Performance for China: Investing in Iraq: Legal and 
Political Aspects, l8TRANSNAT'LL. 71 (2005). 
36. Strong suspicions exist between political blocs which stubbornly fight and 
exchange accusations of power monopolies or attempted dictatorships. See IMTIAZ HUSSAIN, 
AFGHNISTAN, IRAQ AND POST-CONFLICT GOVERNNANCE: DAMOCLIAN DEMOCRACY? 5 (David 
Sciulli ed., Brill Academic Publishers, 2010). 
37. See INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, supra note 12; Parker, supra note 6. 
38. SONER CAGAPTAY ET AL., THE FUTURE OF THE IRAQI KURDS 15 (Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 85, 2008), available at 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyF ocus85 v2. pdf (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
39. An undertaking given to the Sunni movements in return for their political 
involvement. See Parker, supra note 6, at 108. 
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started with a wave of raids and arrests based on terrorism charges 
against the bodyguards of the Minister of Finance, Rafe al-Eissawi, a 
member of the Iraqya political bloc and an iconic Sunni figure. 40 
However, the uprising gave way to larger-scale demands, most 
importantly the angry demand for the freedom of female detainees in 
Iraqi prisons. Protestors accuse security forces of arresting women to 
force their wanted husbands and sons to tum themselves in,41 and call 
for releasing those detainees already proven innocent by court orders, 
but never set free as well as others who were arrested upon informant 
reports while being denied the right to legal investigation. 2 
Regarding protesters, it is important to mention that the way the 
state is addressing the dilemma of terrorism is clearly politicized and 
sectarian. This has caused protesters to call for abolishment of the Anti-
Terrorism Law owing to the notion that it is designed to target Sunni 
Arabs. Moreover, protesters call for the Accountability and Justice Law, 
which has replaced the De-Baathification Law, to be rescinded and for a 
newly enacted amnesty law for all detainees to be put into force. 43 
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki' s response to protesters has 
consisted of a mixture of warnings and approbation. He has expressed 
his willingness to set up a fact-finding committee to investigate the 
cases of detainees and penitentiaries while accusing some demonstrators 
of making up a sectarian crisis and being involved in a clamor that will 
end with a partitioned Iraq.44 
Considering the latest developments in Iraq, the door is wide open 
for partitioning, with the ill omens of civil war looming ahead. 
B. Spread of Corruption 
Globally, the previously quoted indices indicate that corruption has 
reached serious proportions and threatens the development and 
investment programs just as it distorts the economic decision-making 
process and drains the economy. 45 This reduces the quality and volume 
40. Duraid Adnan, Arrest of a Sunni Minister 's Bodyguards Prompts Protests in Iraq, 
N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 21, 2012) at A9. 
41. Rami Ruhayem, Protests Engulf West Iraq as Anbar Rises Against Maliki, BBC 
NEWS (Jan. 2, 2013), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-20887739 
(last visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
42. See Parker, supra note 6, at 102-203. 
43. Ruhayem, supra note 41. 
44. Id. 
45. David Ng, The Impact of Corruption on Financial Markets, 32,10 MANAGERIAL 
FIN. 822-36 (2006). 
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of foreign and local investments. 46 
Despite the fact that most countries in the world contain a certain 
degree of corruption, corruption has never prevented foreign investors 
from investing in these countries. However, the case is different with 
the 169th country of 175 listed that was awarded 18 points by 
Transparency International (TI) in 2012.47 The worst part about this is 
the suspicions regarding the reconstruction efforts undertaken after 
2003 among supporters and donors.48 Corruption is a serious problem, 
especially in Iraq; Iraq is a country rich in natural resources where the 
rule of law has been weakened by consecutive wars and dictatorships. 
Therefore, Iraq is the victim of instability and punitive supervisory 
procedures. Furthermore, since the discovery of oil to the present date, 
Iraq has lost opportunities of economic recovery derived from large oil 
revenues. Corruption, as witnessed currently, is starting to nurture 
terrorism and deepen sectarian divisions. The failure of rehabilitating 
state institutions hinders the development of investment and business 
environments. 49 
Since 2004, there has been a constant series of corruption charges 
within the UN Oil-for-Food Program. 50 The scandal emerged after an 
Iraqi newspaper published a list of 270 persons that included UN 
officials, politicians, and company owners who made use of illegal oil 
transactions as part of the program. Thereafter, the U.S. Congress 
discovered that Saddam Hussein had accumulated a staggering amount 
of USD 17.3 billion from such transactions, of which USD 13.6 billion 
were with neighboring countries. 51 
46. Id. 
47. Corruption Perceptions Index 2012, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, available at 
http://transparency.org/cpi2012/%20results (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
48. M. CherifBassiouni, Postconjlcit Justice in Iraq, 33 HUM. RTs. 15 (2006). 
49. See Charles Tiefer, The Iraq Debacle: The Rise and Fall of Procurement-Aided 
Unilateralism as a Paradigm of Foreign War, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2008); Ryan J. Liebl, 
Rule of Law in Postwar Iraq: From Saddam Hussein to the American Soldiers Involved in 
the Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal, What Law Governs Whose Actions?, 28 HAMLINE L. Rev. 
91 (2005). 
50. The Oil-for-Food Program was designed in 1996 at a cost of USD 60 billion to 
enable Iraq to buy food, medicine, and other necessary supplies using oil revenues. Back 
then, oil volumes had an impenetrable ceiling against the UN-imposed blockade on Iraq 
after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990. The program came to an end because of the invasion of 
Iraq in 2003 and the toppling of Saddam Hussein. See Joy Gordon, When Unilateralism is 
Invisible: A Different Perspective on the Oil-for-Food Scandal, 13 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 59 
(2007). 
51. Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, 
Report on the Management of the Oil-for-Food Programme, Volume II- Report on 
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The UN received backlash for being the entity responsible for the 
program. 52 This led the UN to set up a three-member independent 
committee, presided over by Folker, for investigating the charges. The 
investigations resulted in corruption charges against officials, 
companies,53 and organizations.54 The program damaged the reputation 
and credibility of the UN, and was described as the largest financial 
scandal in history. 55 Astonishingly, Iraqi brokers accused of suspicious 
dealings have emerged once again to contribute to the reconstruction 
stage in Iraq. 56 
With the arrival of U.S. Forces in Iraq, reconstruction finances 
started to flow into the war-tom country. 57 What happened to such 
finances? Washington provided a total of USD 60 billion to 
reconstruction efforts and USD 146 billion in the Iraqi currency. 58 
However, Iraqi citizens have not benefited considerably from these 
funds. How then was the money spent? Recently, the Iraqi Ministry of 
Electricity failed to satisfying the needs of the electricity despite ''the 
true price of Iraq's power crisis is not just the $40bn it costs the Iraqi 
economy annually, but also the growing frustration of the Iraqi populace 
that suffers with only four-five hours of electricity each day."59 Portable 
Investigation (Sept. 7, 2005). 
52. Id. at 3. 
53. A key figure of the scandal was Benon Sevan, the former director of the program, 
who pleaded not guilty to all bribery or complicity charges leveled against him. Kojo, the 
son of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, has been proven to have received payments from 
Cotecna, another suspicious person. See id. at 71-72. 
54. Investigations included French company Total, as well as international companies 
from the Middle East and Russia, in addition to security companies. See id. at 29-30. 
55. The wider scale of this scandal was all about the future of the UN, with the so-
called Neo-conservatives in the United States adding fuel to the fire as an indication of the 
UN' s incompetence. Senator Norm Coleman, head of the Congressional Investigation 
Committee, called for Annan's resignation. See Nile Gardiner, The White House Should 
Call on Kofi Annan to Resign, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Dec. 15, 2004), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2004/12/the-white-house-should-call-on-kofi-
annan-to-resign (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
56. Gordon, supra note 50. The provisional Iraqi Government conducted routine 
investigations in 2005 but never came up with a decision. Id. 
57. David Caron, The Reconstruction of Iraq: Dealing with Debt, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. 
INT'L L. & PoL'Y 123, 126 (2005). 
58. See STUART w. BOWEN, A FINAL REPORT FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL 
FOR IRAQI RECONSTRUCTION, vii , 9 (2013), available at 
http://www.sigir.mil/learningfromiraq/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
59. See Shamsek Asad, Hussain Qaragholi & John Sachs, Iraq 's Power Crisis and the 
Need to Re-engage the Private Sector - Smartly, THE MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC SURVEY 
(Feb. 6, 2012), available at http://www.mees.com/en/articles/3923-iraq-s-power-crisis-and-
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water supplies are cut off every other day. Conditions in the country are 
as poor as those in the "pre-Saddam" era and are worsening because of 
the terrorist attacks, which have claimed the lives of tens of thousands 
since 2003. 60 
Considering this situation, TI warned that reconstruction efforts 
may well tum into the largest corruption scandal in history61 and stated 
that management of oil revenues must be more transparent and 
accountable62 and a weak government, black market, and legacy of 
dictatorship form a dangerous corruption-breeding combination.63 
George W. Bush faced strong pressure from opponents to unveil 
profiteering war-related activities in Iraq.64 Henry Waxman, who 
presides over the Congressional Committee on Integrity and 
Government Reform, said, "[ t ]he money squandered or gulped by 
corruption as part of these contracts are infuriating and astonishing. We 
the-need-to-re-engage-the-private-sector-smartly (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
60. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, ECONOMIC CHALLENGES IN POST-CONFLICT IRAQ, 
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, (2010), available at 
http://csis.org/files/publication/100317 _IraqEconomicFactors.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 
2013). 
6 I. See JEFFREY COONJOHN, CORRUPTION IN POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS: AN IRAQI 
CASE STUDY, (Kurdistan Center for Democracy in the Middle East, 2012), available at 
http://www.kcdme.com/Corruption%20in%20Post-
Contlict%20Environments%2002.02.2012.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
62. TI recommended key steps to be adopted urgently before a "plague of corruption" 
amounts to inevitability and irreparability. International contractors operating in Iraq, 
according to the TI, must abide by the Anti- Corruption Law. Donors and allied forces are 
encouraged to adopt a stricter approach in dealing with the phenomena. TI indicated a 
highly corrupt post-war Iraq. See id. 
63. Bribery has been rampant since the toppling of Saddam Hussein. Some contractors 
and government officials have conceded that corruption widely exists. The report lashed out 
at the U.S. policy of awarding investment contracts in Iraq, depicting the same as secretive 
and favoring certain large companies. TI agrees with some UN bodies, such as the UN 
global consultative body which reported that the U.S. awarded an oil investment contract to 
the Texas-based Halliburton run by Dick Cheney until Cheney was elected Vice President 
of the U.S. last December. A BBC team tracked down the missing billions in a house 
inhabited by Hazem Sha'alan, who was appointed minister of defense in the 2004 Iraqi 
Government in Acton, West London. Sha'alan and accomplices drained about USD 1.2 
billion from the ministry by purchasing old military equipment from Poland while claiming 
it to be state-of-the-art and subsequently transferring the difference in money to personal 
accounts. Radi Ar-Radi, the judge who presided over the Public Commission on Integrity, 
said, "They failed to rebuild the ministry of defense, and hence the continuing violence and 
blood baths. Iraqis and foreigners are still slaughtered, and those corrupt officials are to be 
blamed for that. They are criminals." Sha'alan was sentenced to death, but fled the country 
to avoid this sentence. See id. 
64. See Jane Corbin, BBC Uncovers Lost Iraqi Billions, BBC NEWS (June 10, 2008), 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7444083.stm (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
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may discover that it has been the widest profiteering process m 
history. "65 
The Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 
Reconstruction (SIGIR) identified two reasons for the lack of tangible 
results from the reconstruction efforts in Iraq: (1) rampant corruption66 
and (2) economic mismanagement. However, the 2008 federal report 
revealed that the reconstruction policies adopted by Washington for Iraq 
failed owing to bureaucratic division inside the Pentagon and a lack of 
familiarity with the Iraqi society. 67 
Today, corruption is present in the Iraqi Government at all levels. 
Some ministries are obviously controlled by militias or organized crime 
bosses. 68 The Iraqi Government is incapable of enforcing the bare 
minimum of anti-corruption laws.69 Furthermore, key Government 
officials boldly refuse to engage in or initiate any corruption case 
investigations. Consequently, the Commission of Integrity is not 
empowered to be a true investigative authority. 70 
Despite the powers of the comm1ss10n associated with 
investigating corruption cases, it cannot fulfill its role because of fragile 
security and violent criminals who are controlling various ministries. It 
is impossible to investigate corruption cases without support from the 
police and government. However, in Iraq, such support does not 
currently exist.71 
65. Id. 
66. An example cited by the report is USO 36 billion deal for military equipment, 
weapons, and communication gear for the Iraqi forces, but no one knows about the fate of 
this expenditure. The report also mentions that a U.S. company, DynCorp International, 
submitted USO 18 million in invoices for unjustifiable costs. Furthermore, large amounts 
have been mismanaged or squandered (e.g., a police training camp with a USD 43.8 million 
swimming pool which was never used). See Judith Richards Hope & Edward N. Griffin, 
The New Iraq: Revising Iraq's Commercial Law is a Necessity for Foreign Direct 
Investment and the Reconstruction of Iraq's Decimated Economy, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & 
COMP. L. 875 (2004). 
67. James Glanz & T. Christian Miller, supra note 10. 
68. Parker, supra note 6. 
69. Id. 
70. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Report to Congress, SIGIR 
OBSERVATIONS (July 30, 2012), available at 
http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/July2012/Section 1 -_July_ 2012.pdf#view=fit 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
71. CRISIS GROUP MIDDLE EAST REPORT No.113, FAILING OVERSIGHT: IRAQ'S 
UNCHECKED GOVERNMENT (2011 ), available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009 20 l 4/documents/d-iq/dv/d-
iq20111005 06 _/d-iq20111005 06 en.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
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Accordingly, the commission investigators cannot be relied upon 
to detect criminal activities of persons protected by the influential, even 
to the extent that they cannot be protected in the course of any such 
investigation. Any comment about the ability of Iraqi institutions 
established to combat corruption to enforce anti-corruption laws is 
pointless. Another acknowledgment to be made here is that anti-
corruption and law enforcement efforts have not been well planned in 
the consideration of rampant corruption, which has come to take various 
forms and become a means of profitable trade through which security 
and military positions are acquired in exchange for money. 72 Many 
officials receive bribes for these purposes. Corruption has become a 
human disaster, even a matter of life or death in Iraq, and has found its 
way into child vaccines, portable water, and admittance of fatal 
radioactive goods and foods into Iraq.73 The pressing question here is: 
where do huge amounts of corruption-generated money go? And what 
reasons are behind the increasing rates of corruption? 
Most of such corruption-generated money is used to finance and 
strengthen the ruling parties to ensure their survival and purchase secret 
accounts outside Iraqi borders. The rest of this money is used to finance 
and nurture terrorism. Increasing corruption rates are due to illegal uses 
of oil revenues, which have been on the rise because of increasing oil 
prices.74 
C. Diminished Infrastructure Capacity 
In today's world, infrastructure receives outstanding importance, as 
it is the cornerstone of economic and social development. On one hand, 
infrastructure assumes the role of being the link between economic 
resources of a given country and production structures therein; on the 
other hand, it links production locations and markets, thus boosting 
72. Arming contracts and all security-related activities are corrupting-breeding arenas 
owing to the inability of the independent supervisory bodies to audit them under the pretext 
of national security. See Solomon Moore, Secret Iraqi Deal Shows Problems in Arms 
Orders, N.Y. TIMES (April 13, 2008), available at 
http://www. nyti mes.com/2008/04/ 13/world/middleeast/ l 3arms.html?pagewanted=all& _ r=O 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
73. See Anwar Al-Hamdani, STUDIO 9/AL-BAGHDADIYA TV (2012), available at 
http://www.albaghdadia.com/programs/politics-prog/studio9.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2013) 
(in Arabic). 
74. Patrick Cockburn, Iraq JO Years on: How Baghdad Became a City of Corruption, 
THE INDEPENDANT (Mar. 4, 2013), available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iraq-l O-years-on-how-baghdad-
became-a-city-of-corruption-8520038.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
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economic activities and their horizons and variety in addition to 
improving commercial activities and promoting easier establishment of 
service and production ventures. 
As far as investment is concerned, in developing an efficient 
infrastructure, there is an urgent and inevitable need for attracting direct 
foreign investments (DFls) while enhancing the competitive edge of the 
country concerned. Accordingly, the deteriorated infrastructure in Iraq 
sends a negative message to foreign investors, thus limiting investor-
flowing opportunities. This is the impact of the abovementioned 
situation on economic growth and development. 
Undoubtedly, the Iraqi economy suffers from out-of-date 
infrastructure, which is largely due to the wars in which Iraq has been 
involved75 Iraqi infrastructure has experienced little improvement since 
2003, such as construction of building roads and airports. However, the 
infrastructure, e.g., transportation and electricity utilities, are still 
victimized by out-of-datedness and governmental negligence. 76 It is 
worthy to mention that the low77 electricity production rate has affected 
the performances of other sectors, particularly the industrial sector.78 
75. The Iraq- Iran war wreaked havoc in terms of infrastructure, followed by the First 
and Second Gulf Wars, which wiped it out. Acts of rampage, destruction, and looting also 
contributed to the current situation. Similarly, the electricity dilemma in Iraq started with a 
lack of basic materials and spare parts necessary for maintenance. Technical support for a 
grid station was also lacking due to the economic blockade imposed after the 1991 Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. The dilemma persisted up to 2003, after which Iraq only encountered 
slow-motion schemes in the form of specific investment targets for the electricity sector. 
Poor planning and rampant administrative corruption across the departments in the Ministry 
of Electricity account for this persistent predicament. See William Nordhaus, The Economic 
Consequeces of a War with Iraq, YALE U. (Oct. 29, 2002), available at 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/-nordhaus/iraq.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2013); Asad, Qaragholi, 
& Sachs supra note 59. 
76. Dahr Jamail, A Country in Shambles, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/0l/20121411519385348.html (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2013). 
77. An annual growth rate of 2.8% during the 1990s has been achieved in terms of 
electricity production, marking a rate lower than the population growth rate. In return, 
electricity consumption has increased by an annual rough rate of 8%, marking a clear divide 
in the electricity production levels. Electricity station operation ratings have remained lower 
than needed; as a result, 25% of the institutional capacity in Iraq was hit despite an increase 
in electricity production over four years following 2003, with a total institutional capacity of 
3550 megawatts in 2004, which increased to 5390 megawatts during 2005 only to regress to 
4500 megawatts in 2006 owing to the increasing sabotage against electricity stations and 
towers. The Ministry of Electricity produced only 6850 megawatts in 2013, which means a 
daily operation capacity of 12 hours. See STATISTICS PRODUCTION ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC 
POWER IN IRAQ, SUPERVISORY ANALYSIS 2014(2014) (in Arabic). 
78. The low-capacity infrastructure in Iraq, especially in terms of electricity 
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Terrorist attacks pose a key danger to the shyly growing 
infrastructure, especially when it comes to electricity transmission 
towers and railways. 79 In fact, the lack of strategic thinking and 
appropriate execution of reformative schemes for institutions concerned 
with provision of the services needed for infrastructure rehabilitation 
and development has resulted in a ramshackle and deteriorated the 
national infrastructure. 80 Unfortunately, the excessively weak 
infrastructure has contributed to foreign investors' reluctance to invest 
in Iraq, as such infrastructure would increase operational and reach-out 
costs for local and international markets alike. Eventually, this situation 
discourages foreign investment in Iraq. 
III. DETERMINANTS OF LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
This section highlights the nature of legal limitations that have 
relatively precluded foreign investment flows and distorted the 
investment environment. It further analyzes existing legal limitations, 
which can be classified into three levels: 
A. Inadequate Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property 
Rights 
Laws regarding intellectual property rights in Iraq do not comply 
with the provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in several respects. Copyright Law 
No. 3 of 1971 is not completely harmonious in its use of terms such as 
"author" and "original author" or in its references to the rights included 
in a copyright and for holders of such rights. 81 For example, the 
protection range set forth in the Copyright Law is narrow and only 
production, will impact all other sectors, particularly the industrial sector, given the urgent 
and inevitable need for projects to create electrically powered units. Given the abysmal 
distribution capacity of this sector and the resulting longer blackout periods, individuals and 
institutions, especially those in the private sector, have sought to come up with alternatives 
from private generators to make up for the power shortage. Such generators are fuel 
powered. This leads to increasing electricity costs and consequently higher direct costs in 
the form of higher production costs for production projects. Therefore, one may say that less 
efficient infrastructure is a major hindrance to investment. See Why Business is Still in the 
Dumps, THE ECONOMIST (July 1, 2010), available at http://economist.com/node/16488938 
(last visited Nov. 7, 2013). 
79. Jamail, supra note 76. 
80. Corbin, supra note 65. 
81. See Bashar Malkawi, Iraqi Patent Law: In Search of Compliance with TRIPS, 37 
INT'L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 591 (2007) [hereinafter Malkawi, Iraqi Patent]. 
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provides for consolidated data without any reference to other articles, 82 
while TRIPS provide for readable, selection-based, or content-order-
based works.83 Similarly, Malkawi noted that Copyright Law No. 3 of 
1971 does not address whether the exclusive right to adapt a work 
includes the right to make a cinematographic adaptation of the work. 84 
Further, the protection term under the aforesaid Iraqi Copyright 
Law lags well behind TRIPS, 85 with the law providing for the first 
public issue as the commencement date for protection. 86 
The Trademark Law87 violates the provisions of TRIPS in that it 
allows for the filing of appeals and application of decisions of the 
trademark registrar before the Minister of Industry and Minerals. 88 
However, TRIPS provides for litigation before independent 
administrative and/or judicial entities. 89 
Moreover, despite the introduction of amendments to the Iraqi 
Trademark Law, it still lacks in the use of state-of-the-art technology in 
filing trademark registration applications, mainly because red tape 
procedures are time- and money-consuming as well as less effective.90 
Regarding patents, pursuant to TRIPS, a patent must be a novel 
innovation and applicable industry-wide. However, compared to Article 
27 of TRIPS, Iraqi Patent Law No. 65 of 1970 does not explicitly set 
forth patent-awarding requirements. Therefore, Iraqi legislators have 
made up for this shortcoming through Article 2 of Patent Law No. 65 of 
1970, which was produced to fulfill the aforementioned requirements.91 
In certain parts, Iraqi Patent Law No. 65 of 1970 goes further than 
82. Bashar Hikmet Malkawi, Iraq's Accession to the WTO: Commitments and 
Implications, 6 J. INT'L TRADE L. & PoL'Yl4, 19 (2007) [hereinafter Malkawi, Iraq 's 
Accession]. 
83. See Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property at Art. l 0.2, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_04_e.htm (last visited Sept. 
26, 2013) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
84. See Malkawi, Iraq's Accession, supra note 82. 
85. See TRIPS, supra note 83, at arts. 20.4, 6. 
86. See id. at art. 12 ("[S]uch a term shall be no less than 50 years from the end of the 
calendar year of authorized publication, or, failing such authorized publication within 50 
years from the making of the work, 50 years from the end of the calendar year of making."). 
87. It is worth mentioning that compatibility exists between the Iraqi Law and TRIPs 
in terms of the visual sensitivity requirement for trademarks. See Malkawi, Iraq's 
Accession, supra note 82. 
88. Id. 
89. See TRIPS, supra note 83, at art. 24.3. 
90. See Malkawi, Iraqi Patent, supra note 81. 
91. See Malkawi, Iraq's Accession, supra note 82. 
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TRIPS in that it includes even biological patents for development of 
methods of diagnosis and treatment, surgeries, and protection of flora 
and fauna. Accordingly, Article 3 of the law should be amended to 
accommodate exclusions provided for under Article 27 of TRIPS. 92 
The provisions of the law regarding "fair compensation" are 
ambiguous; an innovator may claim fair compensation from the relevant 
employer in return for such an innovation as long as the same is covered 
by the employment contract period, unless such a contract provides for 
a specific compensation for an innovation. This provision may well 
leave the door wide open for several predictions on accepting 
compensation, setting a fair compensation mechanism in accordance 
with the significance and importance of the innovation in question, and 
the entity associated with setting the compensation value. 93 
Once again, Patent Law No. 65 fails to refer disputes to judicial 
entities. Article 33 of the law allows for appealing a registrar's decision 
to void a patent before the competent minister, while TRIPS provides 
for judicial referral to settle such disputes. 94 The protection period for an 
industrial prototype is seven years as per the Iraqi Patent Law No. 65, 
but 10 years as per TRIPS, in yet another violation of TRIPS. 95 
Furthermore, the Iraqi Government's ability to enforce protection 
of intellectual property rights and enforcement of relevant laws is 
extremely weak. In addition, Iraqi laws on intellectual property rights 
lack procedural measures for border-based customs management when 
it comes to purchasing illegal copies of commodities and shipping them 
across borders amounting to violations of property rights. 96 Moreover, 
such laws are not enforced in the first place. For example, it is possible 
to find hacked copies in public stores. The Iraqi laws on intellectual 
property rights do not authorize competent authorities to self-act for 
92. Id. 
93. See Elizabeth Mirza Al-Dajani, Post Saddam Restructuring of Intellectual Property 
Rights in Iraq Through a Case Study of Current Intellectual Property Practices in Lebanon, 
Egypt, and Jordan, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 250 (2006). 
94. See TRIPS, supra note 83, at art. 32. 
95. See Malkawi, Iraq's Accession, supra note 82, at 19. 
96. It is hoped that the new intellectual property bill will comply with Articles 51-60 
of TRIPS regarding the competent court judgment requirement to finalize customs clearance 
procedures of commodities suspected to be violating intellectual property rights. See 2013 
INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT- IRAQ, U.S. DEP'T OF ST. (2013), available at 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204661.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2013). For this 
purpose, a national committee has been established by the Council of Ministers of relevant 
Iraqi ministries, syndicates, trade bodies, and the private sector to draft a new intellectual 
property rights bill covering all related intellectual property rights. See id. 
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confiscating materials that are proven to be violating property rights. 
Furthermore, registry organizations in ministries and government bodies 
concerned with the protection of intellectual property rights are still 
using primitive tools that do not meet international standards. Finally, 
the Iraqi laws on intellectual property rights are dispersed under several 
laws managed by several bodies. Hence, there is an urgent need to 
consolidate all intellectual property rights under one easily referred to 
law.97 
B. Unclear Iraqi Laws for Ratification of International Arbitration 
Awards 
Iraq is an active member of the Arab League ofNations, and in this 
respect,9 the country is often governed by stipulations from the 1985 
Riyadh Convention,99 which provides a common framework through 
which member states enforce laws (including arbitration laws). 100 
According to Articles 251-276 of the country's civil laws, any 
arbitration proceedings taking place in the country are normally 
considered to be a domestic issue ( even though it may involve a foreign 
party). 101 However, with recent changes in legislation, foreign nationals 
or parties can decide to choose foreign arbitration. 102 
Most states across the globe are common signatories to the New 
97. See Malkawi, Iraq's Accession, supra note 82, at 19. 
98. According to Article 3 oflraq's 2005 Constitution, "Iraq is a country of multiple 
nationalities, religions, and sects. It is a founding and active member in the Arab League 
and is committed to its charter, and it is part of the Islamic world. Article 3, Doustour 
Jaumbouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=l0027 (last visited Nov. 4, 2013). 
99. The Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation was signed on June 4, 1983, 
in "Riyadh," by all the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice except Egypt and Islamic 
Republic of Comoros. Riyadh Arab Agreement for Judicial Cooperation, LEAGUE OF ARAB 
STATES (April 6, 1983), available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b38d8.html 
(last visited Nov. 4, 2013). 
100. Id. at art. 37. "Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 28 and 30 of this 
Agreement, adjudications of arbitrators shall be recognized and executed by any contracting 
party in the manner stipulated in this part subject to the legal norms of the requested party, 
and the competent judicial authority of the requested party may neither discuss the subject 
of such arbitration nor refuse to execute the judgment, except in the following cases: (a) If 
the law of the requested party does not permit the settlement of the subject of the dispute by 
arbitration, (b) If the adjudication of the arbitrators is made in execution of a condition or 
arbitration contract that is void or has not become final, (c) If the arbitrators are non-
competent under the contract or condition of arbitration or under the law on the basis of 
which the adjudication was made." Id. 
101. Saleh Majid, Arbitration in Iraq, 19 ARAB L.Q. 267 (2004). 
102. SHUBBER, supra note 1, at 139-140. 
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York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitrary 
Awards, but Iraq failed to be a signatory to the agreement and is 
therefore excluded from the convention. 103 
Requirements for the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitration decisions in Iraq are unclear because the Law on 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Iraq (No. 30 of 1928) and the 
Civil Procedural Law (No. 83 of 1969) do not regulate such decisions. 
Accordingly, foreign arbitration decisions may not be enforceable in 
Iraq, since this principle cannot be deduced from the provisions 
neglecting the same. Furthermore, Law No. 30 of 1928 has provided 
explicitly for the scope of enforcement in that it requires a decision or 
judgment to be handed down by a court formed outside Iraq for it to be 
enforceable in Iraq. 104 
Iraqi commentators adopt two opinions regarding this negative 
attitude: the first allows for enforcement, while the second denies such 
enforcement. Advocates of the first opinion say that foreign arbitration 
judgments can be enforced in Iraq despite the lack of a legal provision 
to this end. The argument behind this is that the Arbitration Section of 
Iraqi Civil Procedure Law No. 83 of 1969 does not specify judgments 
within the scope thereof. 105 Therefore, such scope cannot be restricted 
without an explicit legal provision. Accordingly, it covers national and 
foreign arbitration judgments, i.e., an absolute provision remains so 
unless restricted by another. According to this opinion, irrespective of 
whether foreign arbitration judgments are covered by international 
conventions for enforcement of foreign arbitrator's judgments, 106 they 
shall be enforced. Moreover, the acceptance of such enforcement in the 
country has become a principle of private law that is common across the 
103. Abdel Sattar al-Beriqdar, spokesman for Iraq's High Judicial Council, told RFE 
that Iraq is keen to join the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Arbitrary Awards. See generally Iraq Drafting International Arbitration 
Law, RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO LIBERTY (2011), available at 
http://www.rferl.org/content/iraq_arbitration/2320391.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2013). 
Despite the fact that Iraqi officials have indicated that they are going to sign the New York 
convention treaty, their failure to do so means that if a foreign national or company is to 
obtain an arbitration award against an Iraqi company ( or individual), it will have to enforce 
the same through the courts. See PAULSSON ET AL., FRESHFIELDS GUIDE TO ARBITRATION 
CLAUSES in INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS (3d ed. 2011 ). 
104. See Dr. Hamzeh Haddad, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Award in Jordan 
and Iraq, Lecture Before the IBA Conference of Bahrain (Mar. 8, 1989), in ARAB INSTITUTE 
OF ARBITRATION & ADR, available at http://www.aiadr.com/aiadr°/o20re/2.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2013). 
105. Id. 
l 06. Maj id, supra note 101. 
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world, as any judgment so handed down in the country is required to be 
enforced. Hence, such enforcement is acceptable in Iraq as per Article 
30 of the applicable Iraqi Civil Law, which provides the following: 
"Any matter not covered by the previous articles regarding conflict of 
laws shall be governed by the most common private international law 
principles." However, the second opinion rejects the above argument, 
as the advocates of the same are (rightly so) in favor of non-acceptance 
of foreign arbitration judgments in Iraq unless the same are regulated by 
international bilateral or multilateral agreements providing for 
enforcement of the arbitrators' judgments in the contracting country if 
Iraq is party thereto. 107 
In addition, enforcement of foreign arbitration judgments is one of 
the most common principles of the private international law worldwide, 
and hence, the potential enforcement thereof in Iraq pursuant to Article 
30 of the Iraqi Civil Law may not be accepted in this respect because 
the aforesaid Article is restricted to a subject of the private international 
law or conflict of laws. It reads as follows: "Any matter not covered by 
the previous Articles regarding conflict of laws shall be governed by the 
most common private international law principles." 108 Considering the 
fact that enforcement of foreign arbitration judgments is not a case of 
conflict of laws, the said Article is not applicable thereto. 109 
Therefore, foreign arbitrator judgments including those handed 
down to settle foreign investment contracts are not applicable in Iraq 
unless provided for by international agreements. In any event, for the 
purposes of enforcement of arbitration decisions by the concerned 
executive authorities, the approval of such a decision by the competent 
court after payment of fees pursuant to Article 272 (Fil) of Iraqi Civil 
Procedure Law No. 83 of 1969 is a requirement of the Iraqi laws. The 
purpose of this procedure is to monitor the arbitrators' work through 
approval or revocation judgments handed down by the competent court 
on the ground that arbitrators are different from judges in terms of legal 
experience. Another reason is to ensure that the arbitrators' decisions 
are not illegal in either subject or form. 110 
107. ABDUL HAMID EL-AHDAB & JALAL EL-AHDAB, ARBITRATION WITH THE ARAB 
COUNTRIES 230 (3d ed. 2011). 
108. Majid, supra note 101. 
109. EL-AHDAB, supra note 107, at 230. 
110. Haddad, supra note 104. 
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C. Institutional Capabilities of Iraqi Judiciary 
Undoubtedly, the Iraqi judiciary has adopted a number of steps to 
wm foreign investors interested in Iraq. 111 However, there are many 
111. In the aftermath of 2003, a new position was introduced in the Iraqi judiciary. 
Additionally, some key reforms were introduced in the Iraqi judicial system; e.g., the 
Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) was restructured by Provisional Civil Coalition Authority 
(PCCA) Order No. 35, whereby the SJC was assigned supervision of the Iraqi judicial 
system independently from the Ministry of Justice. The said order was followed by the 
PCCA-enacted Law No. 12 on May 8, 2004, which was designed to boost an independent 
judiciary by providing for administrative and financial independence of the SJC from the 
Ministry of Justice. See Benjamin B. Brockman-Hawe, The Iraqi High Court: A 
Retrospective and Prospective View, 14 TILBURG L. REV. 422 (2008). An independent 
judiciary is enshrined and well-established in the Iraqi Constitution under Article 4 7, which 
provides for establishing three federal powers in the State of Iraq, the independence of 
which shall established by the Constitution: legislative, executive, and judicial powers. 
Each of these powers shall conduct their work under the "separation of powers" principle. 
See Bassiouni, supra note 48. Furthermore, the judicial power shall be independent, with 
duties and functions conducted by courts of various degrees and types. See Christina J. 
Sheetz & Matthew T. Simpson, Symposium: Rethinking the Future: The Next Five Years in 
Iraq, 24 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 181 (2009). 
Courts shall hand down their judgments pursuant to the applicable laws. In addition to this 
point, judges shall be independent and not subject by any power except that of the law in 
the course of conducting their duties. No power may interfere with judicial affairs or 
administration of justice. See Bassiouni, supra note 48. 
Additionally, the Commercial Court has been created recently by virtue of the SJC 
Statement No. 136, issued on 01/11/2010, which is the first specialist court in Iraq to be 
assigned cases in which a party is a non-Iraqi. After the establishment of the economic 
open-door policy in Iraq, it has become inevitable to create commercial courts to assure 
investors of the presence of an impartial specialist court that allows for summary settlement 
of disputes. Furthermore, a foreign investor may not only plead before such a court in the 
course of legal proceedings marking disputes with private sector entities but also with 
entities from the Iraqi Government. The only difference between a commercial court and a 
court of first instance lies in the involvement of non-Iraqi litigants. However, in a 
commercial case with Iraqi litigants, a court of first instance shall be the competent court. 
See JUDICIARY, ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMERCIAL COURT (2010), available at 
http://www.iraqja.iq/view.680/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (in Arabic); see also Jordan E. 
Toone, Foreign Direct Investment in Iraq: Reassessing the Legal Framework, BYU I.L. & 
MGMT. Rev., (Sept. 25, 2012), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2152037 (last visited 
Oct. 29, 2013). The first judgment of the Commercial Court revoked the decision of the 
Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MoIM), which was the defendant (the trademark 
registering party) on the French Veolia Environment and condemned the defendant for 
registering a trademark in the plaintiff's name pursuant to the legally applicable ways. 
Veolia Environment, the plaintiff, filed an application with the relevant department of the 
defendant to register its trademark, Veolia Environment, in several types of commodities 
and goods following the defendant's refusal to register the same on no legal grounds 
because the trademark was a two-word phrase, while the other trademark was a one-word 
phrase in upper case letters and placed inside a square frame. The trademark to which the 
subject matter of the case is related is not framed and is written in lower case letters. 
Therefore, no similarity exists between both trademarks, and thus, the case was dismissible. 
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challenges ahead, which are obstacles to creating a national world-class 
judiciary. 
The challenge encountered by the Iraqi judiciary is the unmet dire 
needs of judicial institutions in terms of resources, training, and 
facilities. Lack of experience in foreign investment disputes, 
international arbitration, training for judges, and court officers or 
employees are the major concerns. 112 Foreign investors' trust the Iraqi 
judicial system has been compromised by political interferences with 
judicial work, 113 mainly in the form of personal safety threats against 
judges, thus undermining the efficacy of judicial institutions. 114 
Furthermore, outdated legislations and delayed legal reforms undermine 
the integrity of the judiciary and Iraq's. abidance to international 
obligations under international law. 115 Clearly, this leads to delayed 
judgments. As a result of the enforcement of the De-Baathification 
Law, many judges have been relieved of office on the grounds of being 
members of the Baath Party. 116 As a result, only 750 judges remain to 
Moreover, the court reviewed the original copy of the trademark layout and decided to 
appoint three judicial exports to look into the matter. They confirmed non-similarity 
between both trademarks and the subsequent cheating and deceiving of the public into 
buying trademarked commodities bearing misleading trademarks that are not identical. 
There is a clear verbal difference in the pronunciations of the trademarks, and hence, the 
experts grounded the report, which is valid for a judgment pursuant to Article 140 (1) of 
Evidence Law. The Court handed down its judgment based on Articles 5 and 10 of the 
Trademark and Commercial Logos Law No. 21 of 1957. See Commercial Court, Judicial B 
No. 315 I commercial court I 118 (2011) (in Arabic). 
112. Court administrations still feature many administrative technique problems on a 
large scale, all of which are obsolete. Such techniques include keeping case records, not 
integrating records, and primitive and weak exchanges of information. These methods are 
causing a lot of concern owing to the resulting potential disclosure of case details. See 
U.N.E.P., IRAQ INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY ASSESSMENT REPORT 18, 25 (2006), available at 
http://www. unep .org/ disastersandconflicts/portals/ 15 5/ disastersandconflicts/ docs/iraq/I CA_ i 
raq_report.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2013); QED GROUP, LLC, IRAQ INSTITUTIONAL 
CAPACITY BUILDING (ICB) ASSESSMENT, USAIDIIRAQ 2, 52 (May 2010), available at 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADW087.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). 
113. AB.A., JUDICIAL REFORM INDEX FOR IRAQ 35 (2006). 
114. Id. at 29. Terrorist attacks against judges may well cast shadows on the country's 
judicial institutions because investigations and trials are usually followed by threats and 
violence against judges concerned, thus compromising their abilities to fairly and 
impartially look into cases. See id. Most judges lack knowledge of personal security details 
or sufficient training therein. Id. Other areas of lacking include provisions of a judicial safe 
house, safe workplace, and firearms · license. Id. A total of 58 judges and 70 judicial 
officers were killed between 2003 and 2012. See Martyrs of Judges, Iraqja.iq (May 30, 
2012), available at http://www.iraqja.iq/shheedq.php (last visited Nov. 5, 2013) (in Arabic). 
115. AB.A., supra note 112, at 19. 
116. Jeffrey J. Coonjohn & Zuhair al-Maliki, Chaos in the Courts Can Iraq's 
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serve nation-wide judicial needs. Despite the fact that the appointment 
of judges is a top priority for the SJC, it has been slow and accompanied 
by a lack of experience among new judges in handling specific issues 
such as foreign investment disputes. 117 
IV. PILLARS OF THE INVESTMENT ENVIRONMENT 
SUFFER SUBSTANTIAL CRACKS 
Although Iraq has taken significant steps to create an attractive and 
competitive investment environment together with the enactment of 
Investment Law No. 13 of 2006 and establishment of the National 
Investment Commission, which has given way to rising hopes of strong 
Iraq-bound foreign investment flows, the following limitations account 
partly for foreign investors' reluctance to flow into Iraq. 
A. Imbalance in Investment Commissions 
The facilitating procedures of foreign investors' dealings with 
government commissions in the investment hosting country would 
normally mark a positive economic and commercial activity 
encouraging attitude. 1 8 Therefore, the Iraqi Investment Law No. 13 of 
2006 provides for establishing investment commissions 119 that shall be 
responsible for developing and planning national investment policies, 
facilitating investment law enforcement by enacting regulations and 
directives, and monitoring the execution of strategic investment 
projects. 120 
However, the Iraqi National Investment Commission (NIC) was 
born politically dependent. Political rifts and corruption cast shadows 
Embattled Chief Justice Fend-off Presidential Strategists, JJCOONJOHN.COM (Feb 26. 2013), 
available at http://jjcoonjohn.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Chaos-in-the-Courts-.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 27, 2013); Pfiffner, supra note 21. The Chief Justice was removed from 
service on the grounds of being a member of the Baath Party. Coonjohn, supra; Pfiffner, 
supra note 21. Jeffrey Coonjohn, a Senior Policy Advisor working in the Middle East, 
North Africa, and Central Asia commented, "Valentine's Day was none too sweet for Iraq's 
Chief Justice Medhat al-Mahmoud this year. Coonjohn, supra note 115; Pfiffner, supra 
note 21. The 79-year-old jurist awoke to find himself ignominiously ousted from his post as 
a result of having once been Saddam Hussein's personal legal advisor." Coonjohn, supra; 
Pfiffner, supra note 21. 
117. A.B.A., supra note 113, at 18. 
118. SHUBBER, supra note 1, at 48. 
119. See The Investment Law Oct. 2006 Article 4, TRADE, available at 
http://trade.gov/static/iraq_investmentlaw.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) [hereinafter 
Investment Law]. 
120. SHUBBER, supra note 1, at 49. 
27
Al Abasey: Cakes Without Sugar: Reasons Behind Foreign Investor Reluctance t
Published by SURFACE, 2013
172 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 41: 1 
largely on the commission performance of the local NIC. 121 Political 
quotas played a key role in choosing NIC officers and employees, thus 
leading to incompetent individuals being entrusted with the 
responsibility of management of investment commissions. 122 
Furthermore, the private sector, represented by high-profile 
businessmen or key investors, is not represented in the NIC board. 123 
Much to Iraq's detriment, the non-professional administration of some 
investment commissions has led to politically-motivated decisions 
granting or denying investment licenses; 124 investment commissions 
have not been far from the government bodies causing corruption, of 
which the Commission of Integrity (Col) has detected several cases of 
blackmailing foreign investors into bribing employees for completing or 
approving investments and disburse payments. 
The NIC has not fulfilled its role, nor has it worked smoothly, as it 
failed to reconstruct a foreign investment friendly environment. 
Moreover, the NIC never had an investment advancement plan and even 
lacked a comprehensive vision to plan for foreign investment 
attraction. 125 All of this led to incorrect investment choices in terms of 
121. Consequences of political rifts in the Iraqi Government include lack of 
coordination concerning obtainment of approvals for key projects that end up rejected owing 
to the non-obtainment of necessary approvals because of political rifts in decision-making 
circles. See Hussein Tamimi, Iraq Needs to Rehabilitate and Expand Infrastructure 
Investment through the Gate, NENO's PLACE (Jan. 17, 2013), available at 
http://nenosplace.forumotion.com/t973-iraq-needs-to-rehabilitate-and-expand-
infratstructure-investment-through-the-gate (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). 
122. See Assessment of Current and Anticipated Economic Priorities in Iraq, USAID-
TIJARA at A-79 (2012), available at https://tijara-
iraq .com/?pname=resources _ tech&doctype=2 l &t_ t=Technical_Reports (last visited Oct. 
27, 2013) [hereinafter USAID]. In general, NIC employees show a very modest level of 
expertise and competence, especially in terms of mastering foreign languages, 
administrative systems, and e-control. Iraq Investment Climate Statement Bureau of 
Economic, Energy, and Business Affairs, IRAQPROJECT.COM, available at 
http://iraqproject.com/investment-in-iraq/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2013). 
123. See Investment Law, supra note 119. 
124. The most critical point here is that investment commissions have lost their 
institutional professionalism regarding the vision behind establishment and performance. 
They are the victims of political pressures that have affected their performance. For such 
reasons, investment commissions have lost their credibility and necessary political support 
to interact effectively with investors and national institutions (as put forward by the Council 
of Representatives). See Rahim al-Uqailee, Corruption in Iraq Hampered Investment, 117 
JUDICIARY 12 (2012) (in Arabic). 
125. The NIC does not have a clear-cut integrated plan for current or future investment 
opportunities. Qusay al-Abadi, a member of the Parliamentary Economy and Investment 
Committee, called to cancel the national investment for failing to ensure the success of the 
investment process in the country. See Ahmed Hussein, Ebadi Suggests Canceling Iraqi 
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serving Iraqi development priorities. 126 In addition, the NIC could have 
played a greater role in supporting Iraqi legislators and the government 
via identification of key obstacles to foreign investment inflow, with a 
view to adopting appropriate solutions considering direct contact of the 
NIC with investors, which enables the NIC to spot obstacles to smooth 
inflows of foreign investments into Iraq. 127 
Iraq's foreign investment promotion policy has never been 
commensurate with the country's investment needs. Shortcomings in 
terms of promotion have been a key characteristic of the NIC; the NIC 
has never established a promotion unit through which it may raise 
awareness of the parties concerned through media campaigns, 
conferences, or websites, thus creating a "foggy" perspective in the 
already investor-reluctant investment environment. 128 
Furthermore, despite the participation of the NIC in international 
and national affairs, the organization needs more effective and active 
participation to attract individuals and corporations to Iraq by displaying 
available investment opportunities, distributing promotional booklets 
and holding direct meetings with key investors or companies to provide 
first-hand knowledge of investment projects in the country. 129 
In addition, the NIC Marketing Department lacks strategic means 
for targeting and building relationships with clients. Most NIC 
employees do not master communication and foreign-language skills. 
The mechanisms adopted to follow planning and project-licensing 
National Investment Commission, IRAQI NEWS (Oct. 11, 2012), available at 
http://www.iraqinews.com/baghdad-politics/ebadi-suggests-canceling-iraqi-national-
investment-commission/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2013); John Lee, Sadrist MP calls for 
Abolition of NIC, IRAQ Bus. NEWS (Jan. 11, 2013), available at http://www.iraq-
businessnews.com/?s=Failure+of+iraq+National+lnvestment+ Commission&x=42&y=l6 
(last visited Oct. 28, 2013); Qusay al-Abadi, Call to Cancel the Investment Commissions, 
ALL IRAQ NEWS (2012), available at 
http://www.alliraqnews.com/index.php?option=com _ content&view=article&id=:2012-1 O-
l l-16-3 7-4 l &catid=4 l :201 l-04-08-l 7-27-2 l&ltemid=86 (last visited Oct. 28, 2013). 
126. NIC suggestions, proposed by local investment commissions, should be studied, 
prioritized, and then listed as part of the wider national investment plan. See SUPPORTING 
INVESTMENT POLICY AND GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN IRAQ, supra note 4, at 16, 18. 
127. The NIC argues that it has never been enabled to serve as an independent, 
empowered member to adopt an investment attraction and sustainment strategy, but suffers 
from governmental and political pressures. See id. at 20. 
128. The NIC lacks sufficient and accurate information about the investment 
environment in Iraq, particularly about the legal framework to establish investments, seize 
available investment opportunities, and provide statistics and studies. See id. at 38. 
129. See Mohammed al-Musawi, Weaknesses in the Performance of Investment 
Commissions, 18 AL-QADISIYA L. SCI. 350 (2013) (in Arabic). 
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processes such as design, purchase, production, distribution, marketing, 
post-transaction services, search, and development are still paper-
based.130 Furthermore, the NIC Department of Statistics has only 
limited and far from accurate statistics, which lack any classification or 
analyses. This leads to difficult investment decision-making in the light 
of uncertainties owing to a lack of a reliable database. 131 
The performance of the NIC has always been distorted by conflicts 
and interference with ministries. Despite entrusting the NIC with the 
responsibility of planning and executing investment projects, the 
investment and development departments in other government bodies 
that are entrusted with establishing ministry specific investments are 
still in charge of such planning and execution. This led to a lack of a 
comprehensive investment vision. 132 Therefore, the long-awaited 
objective of reconstructing the national economy has never 
materialized. This was further worsened by the presence of weak 
political will in standardizing the existing institutional framework of 
action, the controversial applicable laws, which are too ambiguous to 
settle such duplication of roles. 133 
The NIC-provincial investment commission relationship is all 
about interference in terms of power and capacities despite the 
supervisory powers given to the NIC and the requirements that such 
provincial bodies act in line with the National Investment Plan. 134 
However, there is an objection to the non-regulation of potential 
conflicts between the NIC and provincial or territorial counterparts. A 
clear manifestation of this conflict materialized in cooperation cessation 
and contract termination threats delivered by the Iraqi Government to 
Shell and Exxon Mobil, should the latter sign contracts with the 
Government of Iraqi Kurdistan. 135 As explained by the Central 
Government, the reason behind such disputes is that the Kurdistan 
Board of Investment is not authorized to issue oil exploration 
130. See Zainab Abbas, National Investment Commission Under the Hammer, 18 AL-
QADISIY AL. SCI. 350 (2011) (in Arabic). 
131. SUPPORTING INVESTMENT POLICY AND GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN IRAQ, supra note 
4, at 38. 
132. USAID, supra note 122, at 27. 
133. Id. at 38, 47. 
134. al-Musawi, supra note 129. 
135. The Exxon Mobil-Kurd oil deal spat spotlights Iraq's juggling act between 
politics and investments. See Alice Fordham & Dan Morse, Exxon Mobil Dispute Deepens 
Arab-Kurd Spit in Iraq, WASH. POST (Apr. 5, 2012), available at 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/20 l 2-04-05/world/35453128 _ 1 _ kurdistan-regional-
govemment-kurdish-region-exxon-mobil (last visited Nov. 4, 2013). 
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licenses. 136 The Iraqi Ministry of Oil continually requests that 
Kurdistan notify the ministry of all oil agreements signed by the latter 
with international companies. 137 In tum, the Ministry of Natural Wealth 
and Resources in Kurdistan argues that the Iraqi Constitution gives Iraqi 
provinces the right to enter into contracts with oil companies. 138 It 
appears that such disputes will persist because of the lack of legislation 
for regulating Iraqi oil wealth. 1 9 The Iraqi legislature is blamed for not 
referring to the legal personality of the govemorate non-provincial 
investment authorities so that it can enjoy the same personality as the 
National Investment Authority in Baghdad. This lack of legal 
personality would limit their powers regarding issuance of investment 
licenses for investors considering such authorities' financial 
dependence. 140 
For these reasons, some Iraqi writers and officials have called for a 
"Supreme Investment Council" along the lines of the Supreme Energy 
Council, which was formed in neighboring Arab countries. This council 
is supposed to consist of the NIC, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
Planning, and representatives from departments of investment in other 
ministries and bodies under the management of the Ministerial 
Cabinet. 141 
The objective of setting up the Supreme Investment Council is to 
settle existing disputes between the NI C and ministries and standardize 
investment plans and efforts. 142 This can be realized by setting up the 
136. The Iraqi Government declared the illegality of production-sharing agreements 
between foreign companies and the Kurdistan Regional Government. Rex J. Zedalis, Iraqi 
Oil Revenues from its Sale: A Review of How Existing Security Council Resolutions Affected 
and the Past ad May Shape the Future, 18 EUR. J. INT'L L. 499 (2007). For instance, 
Hussain al-Shahristani, Deputy Prime Minister of Energy Affairs, said, "Iraq was 'weighing 
measures' that it may take against Exxon after the company signed what the central 
government considers to be illegal contracts with the Kurds." Id. 
137. See Johnny West, Iraq's Last Widow: Diffusing the Risks of a Petro-State (Ctr. 
For Global Dev., Working Paper No. 266, 2011); Abbas, supra note 130. 
138. ZEDALIS, supra note 28, at 31. 
139. Iraqi Oil Minister Mr. Ghadban stated, "I am not optimistic that the energy law 
will be adopted in the coming months, and I would be happy if it is adopted by the end of 
the year." He also stated that, "The more the law is delayed, the more we will have problems 
such as the one with Exxon Mobil." See Kadim Ajrash & Nayla Razzouk, Iraq's Oil Law 
May Be Pushed Till End of 2012, Ghadhban Says, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2, 2012), available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-02/iraq-s-energy-law-may-be-delayed-for-rest-
of-year-ghadhban-says.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). 
140. al-Musawi, supra note 129. 
141. al-Abadi, supra note 125. 
142. SUPPORTING INVESTMENT POLICY AND GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN IRAQ, supra note 
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proposed Supreme Investment Council, which will have the upper hand 
in decisions taken by ministries and the NIC, thus leading to the 
commitment of conflicting parties to the enforcement of the same. 
Considering its high-level political management, the Supreme 
Investment Council may well overcome the obstacle of political rifts. 
However, this study argues against the establishment of the Supreme 
Investment Council, thus adding another obstacle to the already 
obstacle-ridden institutional framework. The viability of a national 
investment commission under the role assigned to the Supreme 
Investment Council is questionable. If the solution is to introduce an 
administrative council, reform should be introduced a fortiori to the 
NIC. Accordingly, the key critique thrown at the suggestion lies in the 
violation of principles on which Investment Law No. 13 of 2006 is 
based. 
B. Bureaucracy in Land Allocation for Investment Projects 
In the pre-1991 war era, Iraq had an outstanding position in the 
Middle East thanks to its distinguishable abilities in public sector 
management, which used to have a segment of well-trained and highly 
qualified civil servants. 143 While good institutional capabilities still exist 
across several fields, the long years of war and international isolation 
resulted in the following issues: (1) diminished investments in key 
domains of public sector management which diminished the 
administrative capabilities of civil service; (2) very large numbers of 
public sector employees stemming from a lack of job opportunities 
elsewhere (the Iraqi Government has become one of the largest pools of 
employees worldwide); (3) limited e-governance and automation; (4) 
lower credit standards, higher corruption rates, and a weaker public 
sector; and (5) inefficient economic governance in general. 144 All these 
factors combine to yield a weaker and less efficient government, 
particularly when it comes to the ability to provide key services and 
assume responsibility for organizational responsibilities. 1 5 
The main shortcoming to be spotted here is the strictly central 
administration that rules by unquestionable orders and the 
4, at 37. 
143. Coyne & Pellillo, supra note 6. 
144. USAID, supra note 122, at 52. 
145. See, e.g., ABBAS ALNASRAWI, THE ECONOMY OF IRAQ: OIL, WARS, 
DESTRUCTION OF DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS,1950-2010 168-169(2010); SUPPORTING 
INVESTMENT POLICY AND GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN IRAQ, supra note 4, at 102. 
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accomp anying red tape that takes the form of a series of orders and 
bodes. 46 This type of administration has fallen afoul of requirements 
for investments because the latter requires simple, out-of-the-box, and 
swift mechanisms to come to fruition. 47 
Along with the complicated political transition, the administration 
related challenges prevented the enforcement of necessary structural 
changes to re-engineer the government and its mechanisms. Red tape, 
lack of administrative efficiency, and blackmailing investors are key 
obstacles to investments, as seen by Sarni al-Aa'raj, head of the NIC. 148 
The One-Stop-Shop Authority (OSSA) is the only entity an 
investor would visit if willing to be in Iraq. The OSSA facilitates the 
investment process by equipping investors with the investment permit 
without interference by the bureaucratic red tape. 149 
However, the one-stop-shop policy has not eliminated the red tape; 
even by bringing investment and land allocation licensing processes to a 
more complicated level there is still the requirement to obtain approvals 
from a large number of ministries and bodies. 15° For example, 
considering Iraq's position as the world's second largest country with 
oil reserves, the exploration operations for which are still underway, 
approval must be obtained from the Ministry of Oil to establish an 
investment on a given part of land. Difficulties can be easily imagined if 
146. See Coyne & Pellillo, supra note 6. 
147. Id. 
148. See Abdul Malik Mahmoud, Investment in Iraq: Reality or Illusion?, 83 ALRRAUD 
MAG. 8 (2012). Abdullah al-Ismaili, head of Development Affairs at the Omani Gulf Energy 
Company, said that the investment process has several obstacles and red tape to the extent of 
scaling down ambitions of foreign investors, particularly in terms of obtaining licenses for 
investments and importing materials to be used for such investments. See al-Musawi, supra 
note 129. In tum, Taymour al-Byali, the representative of a U.S. construction company, 
said that the current situation in Iraq requires many measures, most of which are 
complicated. See Mahmoud, supra. Furthermore, the Vice President of the Parliamentary 
Committee on Provinces, Mansour at-Tamimi, told Free Iraq Radio that the investment 
problem in Iraq is very complex owing to myriad obstacles, highlighting that the way 
investors are dealt with is too poor for them to maintain their investments in Iraq. 
Accordingly, the investment environment has become repellent rather than attractive. At-
Tamimi also revealed that the one-stop-shop has failed in terms of investment facilitation. 
Selling or leasing lands for purposes of investment is very complicated because of red tape 
and conflicts between investment authorities and institutional owners of such lands. See 
Abbas, supra note 130. 
149. See JAMES A. BAKER III & LEE H. HAMILTON, THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP REPORT 
(2006), available at http://media.usip.org/reports/iraq_study_group_report.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 28, 2013 ). 
150. SUPPORTING INVESTMENT POLICY AND GOVERNANCE REFORMS IN IRAQ, supra note 
4, at 35-36. 
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the reply obtained from the Ministry of Oil is "oil or other sources of 
energy soil tests are not finalized." 151 
The NIC is also required to obtain approvals from the Ministry of 
Water Resources, 152 Ministry of Electricity, 153 Ministry of Defense, 
Ministry of Interior, 154 Ministry of Finance, 155 Ministry of Construction 
and Housing, 156 Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Tourism and 
Antiquities, 157 and Customs and Free Zones Authority before any 
investment license can be issued. 
Considering the inherent red tape and delays, obtaining approvals 
from the aforementioned departments inevitably leads to significantly 
delayed efforts by the NIC, especially because of the political disputes 
between the NIC and the political "references" of such ministries and 
bodies. 
C. Financial Markets 
Any outdated legislation that regulates companies operating in the 
Iraqi financial market must be amended to catch up with the new Iraqi 
economic trend toward a market economy and to keep up with the 
151. Abbas al-Yasiri, Corruption in the Form of Bureaucracy: The Investment Projects 
as a Case Study, 79 J. KUFA U. 352 (2013) (Iraq). 
152. Iraq is an agricultural country wherein the rivers Euphrates and Tigris flow in 
addition to many creeks and water bodies that irrigate vast agro lands. Therefore, the NIC 
must obtain the approval of the Ministry of Water Resources and the Ministry of Agriculture 
to ensure that there is no conflict between an investment and public or private rights on the 
site proposed for such investment. See Abbas, supra note 130. 
153. Iraq has an electricity grid that encompasses almost every part of the country. 
Considering the severe power shortage, the Government has prioritized projects of the 
Ministry of Electricity. For its part, the NIC is committed to non-conflict with grid lines or 
the projects of the Ministry of Electricity. See Mahmoud, supra note 148. 
154. Since 2003, Iraq has faced a wave of terrorism and instability causing change in 
heavy security forces across Iraqi cities. Therefore, it is the NIC's duty to avoid issuing an 
investment license unless approvals of security institutions are obtained first. See al-
Musawi, supra note 129. 
155. The Ministry of Finance is the body entrusted with allocating government-owned 
lands. Id. Therefore, it holds the power to allot a piece of land to the NIC. See id. 
156. The Ministry of Housing exerts enormous efforts to build housing communities in 
a large number of governorates and on vast sites under a long-term plan to build five million 
housing units. Id. Accordingly, the Ministry of Housing must be contacted to ensure non-
conflict with NIC projects. See id. 
157. Iraq has been home to the civilizations of Babylon, Assyria, Sumer, and Akkad in 
addition to the Islamic civilization. Mahmoud, supra note 148. Because of this, monuments 
are almost ubiquitous, and excavation efforts for artifacts of these prior civilizations are 
underway in many sites. This has caused the NIC's commitment to not introducing 
investment projects that may be harmful to archeological sites. See id. 
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legislation regulating international financial markets. 158 A lack of legal 
protection takes away the confidence of Iraqi and foreign investors and 
capital owners and holds them back from operating effectively in such a 
market. Furthermore, this market suffers from weak monitoring tools 
and measures, which secures minimum disclosure and transparency for 
those concerned-a fact that has given rise to companies operating in 
the Iraqi market with limited finances, with the exception of banks that 
are required by the Central Bank to hold a minimum capital of 250 
billion Iraqi Dinars, compared to 15 billion Iraqi Dinars for money 
transfer companies, 150 million Iraqi Dinars for exchange companies, 
1-2 billion Iraqi Dinars for small- and medium-sized loan companies, 
and 150 million Iraqi Dinars for financial investment companies. 159 In 
addition, some companies have weak or limited databases, much to the 
detriment of investors in terms of taking safe and quick consultative 
decisions. 160 Other weaknesses include lack of flexibility in the 
prevailing interest rate structure, especially with banks and insurance 
companies that offer mid- and long-term loans for real estate 
purposes. 161 
V. DEMONSTRATION OF THE HYPOTHESIS: IRAQ 
RANKING IN INTERNATIONAL INDICATORS OF THE 
INVESTMENT CLIMATE 
Many international bodies and organizations provide investors and 
decision makers with digital information that helps them make 
investment decisions. This help takes the form of a number of indices 
that clarifies the efficiency of an investment environment. 162 Statistical 
studies have proven that there is a close relationship between a 
country's rank on such indices and how much investment it attracts. 163 
To boost the stance of this study and show how faulty governmental 
reforms have proven to be obstacles to foreign investment in Iraq, the 
158. See Doing Business in Iraq: A Legal Guide, CEKTIR & BASARI L. FIRM (2011 ). 
159. See Daveed Gartenstein-Ross & Joshua D. Goodman, The Global Economic 
Crisis & Iraq's Future, THE JEWISH PoL'Y CENTER, available at 
http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/966/global-economic-crisis-iraq-future/ (last visited Oct. 
28, 2013). 
160. Benjamin B. Brockman-Hawe, The Iraqi High Court: A Retrospective and 
Prospective View, 14 TILBURG L. REV. 422 (2008). 
161. THE WORLD BANK, REPUBLIC OF IRAQ: FINANCIAL SECTOR REVIEW 11(2012). 
162. Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay, Governance Indicators: Where Are We, Where 
Should We Be Going?, 23 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 1 (2008). 
163. UNCTAD, supra note 5. 
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following points examine Iraq's performance in the investment climate 
on the basis of international indices. 
A. Index of Economic Freedom 
Economic freedom is one of the most important investment-
attracting factors because it constitutes the best means for reaching an 
advanced level of growth and economic welfare. Economic freedom is 
measured using a number of variables that seek to figure out how open 
an economy is and how much the state interferes with its economy. 164 
Iraq has continued to miss a position on the 2013 index because of 
a lack of reliable data on economic liberalism within the country. Iraq 
has been categorized among the countries with zero economic 
liberalism, and a 4.9-point classification on the index during 1997-
2001. In 2002, this classification went up to 5, which is the highest 
ceiling for a total lack of economic liberalism, thus marking an 
unmistaken situation of zero economic liberalism, a tighter grip on 
economic activities, and expansion of state or government control. 1 5 
To have the pre-2003 Iraq so classified among states with zero 
economic liberalism is a result that sounds pretty logical because of the 
economic policies and measures adopted by the country's pre-2003 
governments. This period was an era of heavy state interference with its 
economy. However, in post-2003 Iraq, there has been an economic 
reformist approach with a view to larger economic liberalism. However, 
the steps adopted by Iraq have never been sufficiently convincing to 
merrit any enhancement considered in its classification. 
B. Ease of Doing Business Index 
The Ease of Doing Business Index, created and updated annually 
by the World Bank Group (WBG) and International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), is a compound index consisting of ten sub-
components that make up the base for a business-doing environment. 
This index measures how a country's laws and governmental 
procedures affect its economic situation while focusing on the small-
164. See 2013 Index of Economic Freedom: About the Index, HERITAGE FOUND. & 
WALL ST. J. (2013), available at http://www.heritage.org/index/about (last visited Oct. 30, 
2013). The Heritage Foundation introduced this index in 1995 in conjunction with the Wall 
Street Journal. Other bodies concerned with measuring economic freedom include the Fraser 
Institute of Canada and the Dubai International Financial Center (DIFC). 
165. See 2013 Index of Economic Freedom: Iraq, HERITAGE FOUND. & WALL ST. J. 
(2013), available at 
http://www.heritage.org/index/pdf/2013/countries/iraq.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). 
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and medium-scale enterprise sector with a view toward developing 
benchmarks for measuring and comparing business environment 
conditions in developed and developing countries. 166 
In 2013, Iraq ranked 165 out of 185 countries on the Ease of Doing 
Business Index, pushing it two ranks behind its placement in 2012. Iraq 
debuted on this Index in 2005, when it ranked 114 out of 155 countries, 
before moving behind to 145 out of 17 5 in 2006 and 146 in 2007 and 
2008, with a persistent backward trend to 152 in 2009 and 166 in 2010 
and 2011. These classifications explain the difficulties encountered by 
the Iraqi investment, which is additional proof of the futility of the post-
2003 reforms. 167 
C. Country Risk Rating 
The country-based risk assessment indices include a number of 
indications for investment- hosting countries that affect the flow-in of 
foreign investments. These include political, economic, and financial 
risks. Iraq has always been ranked low on all these indices, which is 
further proof of the obstacles to investing in Iraq. The unanimous 
categorization of Iraq by all these indices indicates the height of the 
risks facing investments in Iraq. Country-based risk assessment indices 
are issued by several specialist bodies, and the following are some of 
them: 
1. International Country Risk Guide 
The BRS International Country Risk Guide is a monthly guide first 
issued in 1980 that measures investment-related risks. 168 This guide 
covers 140 countries, including Iraq, which remained among the high-
risk countries untill 2012. From 2004 to 2007, Iraq was among the very 
high-risk countries but moved forward to the moderate risk category in 
2008, only to move back to the high-risk category from 2009 to 2012. 169 
166. Ease of Doing Business and Distance to Frontier, WORLD BANK GROUP & INT'L 
FIN. CORP. (2013), available at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/-/media/GIA WB/Doing%20Business/Documents/ Annual-
Reports/English/DB 14-Chapters/DB 14-Ease-of-doing-business-and-distance-to-frontier. pdf 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2013). 
167. Doing Business 2013: Economy Profile: Iraq, WORLD BANK GROUP & INT'L FIN. 
CORP. (2013), available at 
http://www.trade.gov/iraq/build/ groups/pub lic/@tg_ iqtf/ documents/webcontent/tg_ iqtf _ 003 
994.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). 
168. International Country Risk Guide Methodology, PRS GROUP (2013), available at 
http://www.prsgroup.com/PDFS/icrgmethodology.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). 
169. Political Risk Rating: Iraq, PRS GROUP (2012), available at 
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2. Euromoney Country Risk 
This index is semiannually issued by the magazine Euromoney to 
measure a country's ability to meet its foreign obligations, such as debt 
service, paying for imports when due, and freedom to transfer 
investment returns and capital. This index has nine sub-indices with 
various weights. The greater the percentage of an index, the lower the 
risk that a country would not meet its obligations. 170 
In total, 185 countries are covered by this index. According to the 
2012 results, Iraq belongs to the high-risk category of states. In 2004-
2011, Iraq has been swinging between the very high-risk to high-risk 
categories. 171 
3. Institutional Investor Index 
The Investment Corporation index has been issued semiannually 
since 1998 and covers 173 countries. 172 Iraq was categorized among the 
high-risk countries during 2010-2012. From 2004 to 2009, Iraq was a 
very high-risk country, except for 2008 when it was a high-risk 
country. 173 
4. Dun & Bradstreet Index 
This index measures country specific international commercial 
exchange-related risks, paying attention to assessing country specific 
risks that are not related to a country's ability to meet the obligations of 
not only debt repayment, investment capital and returns, and payment 
for imports to exporters, but also missed exportation and investment 
opportunities. The index in question depends on four categories of 
variables that cover political risks, macro-economic risks, external, and 
commercial risks. 174 Covering 132 countries, the index has classified 
http://www.prsgroup.com/FreeSampleRequest.aspx?fs=/prsgroup shoppingcart/freedata.asp 
x@@ctry_id=44 (last visited Oct. l, 2013). 
170. World Risk Average, EUROMONEY COUNTRY RISK (2013), available at 
http://www.euromoneycountryrisk.com/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
171. Iraq's wiki, EUROMONEY COUNTRY RISK (2014), available at 
http://www.euromoneycountryrisk.com/Wiki/Iraq (last visited Mar.15, 2013). 
172. Global Rankings, INSTITUTIONAL INV. (2013), available at 
http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Research/4 l 43/Global-Rankings.html (last visited Sep. 
14, 2013). 
173. Id. 
174. Country Risk Subscriber Zones, Dun & BRADSTREET INDEX (2013), available at 
http://www.dnbcountryrisk.com/?page=fctryriskl (last visited Sept. 25, 2013). 
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Iraq among the highest risk group from 2004 to 2012. 175 
5. Co/ace Index 
183 
This index measures the risks related to a country's failure to repay 
its debts and highlights how corporate financial obligations are affected 
by the performance of the local economy, local political conditions, and 
economic relations with the outer world. Countries are classified into 
two key groups: (1) Investment Class Countries A, which branches out 
into four classes (Al-A4) and (2) Speculation Class Countries (B, C, 
and D). According to this 164-state index, Iraq belongs to Group 2, with 
a low class of D, i.e., Iraq is categorized as a high-risk country. 176 Two 
of the negative results that emerges from a Co face index of 2014 are 
"Ethnic and religious rivalries complicating the establishment of the 
rule of law and fuelling the risk of civil war; Insecurity and institutional 
weaknesses delaying reconstruction and investment". 177 
D. Transparency Index 
The Transparency Index was started in 1993 by Transparency 
International, which defines "corruption" as "abuse of public office for 
private gain." This index measures the transparency level by
determining corruption levels among public servants and politicians. 1 8 
Iraq was introduced to Tl's reports in 2003. Iraq ranked 113 
internationally and 16 in the Arab world, with a 2.2-point 179 index, 
dropping down to 2.1 in 2004 to rank 129 internationally and 17 in the 
Arab world. In 2005, the index went up to 2.2, leading Iraq to rank 137 
internationally and 1 7 in the Arab world. Iraq dropped in 2006 and 2007 
to international ranks of 160 and 178, respectively, and 17 and 16, 
respectively, in the Arab world, with a 1.9-point index in 2006 and 1.4 
in 2007. In 2008, the status oflraq worsened to hit 1.3, ranking 178, but 
went back up in 2009, 2010, and 2011 as ranking 176, 175, and 169, 
175. Country Risk: Iraq, DUN & BRADSTREET (2013), available at 
https://www.dbai.dnb.com/int/en/dbai_frame.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2013). 
176. Economic Studies: Iraq, COFACE (2013), available at 
http://www.coface.com/Economic-Studies-and-Country-Risks/Iraq (last visited Oct. 29, 
2013). 
177. Economic Studies: Major Macroeconomic Indicators: Iraq, COFACE (2013), 
available at http://www.coface.com/Economic-Studies-and-Country-Risks/Iraq (last visited 
Mar. 14, 2014). 
178. Who We Are: Our history, 1993 In the beginning, TRANSPARENCY INT'L (2013), 
available at http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/history (last visited Oct. 29, 2013). 
179. Corruption Perceptions Index, TRANSPARENCY INT'L (2012), available at 
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2012/results (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). 
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respectively, with 1.5, 1.8, and 18 points in 2012. 180 
The quoted indices simply add to a distrustful investment 
environment and the growing reluctance of investors to investing in Iraq 
owing to lack of transparent transactions. 
E. Governance Indicator 
Governance Indices are issued by the World Bank Group following 
the collection of respective elements from various sources. These 
indices monitor governance and institutions entrusted with power in a 
given country. Such monitoring includes the mechanisms of electing, 
supervising, and replacing a country's government, a government's 
ability to develop and enforce sound and efficient policies, and respect 
from citizens and the state for institutions that govern a country's 
economic and social relations. 181 The Percentile Index is adopted here to 
figure out where Iraq stands among the rest of the world. 
1. Regulatory Quality Index 
This index develops perceptions of a government's ability to 
develop and enforce sound policies and regulations that help encourage 
private sector growth. 182 Iraq's ranks on this index have been 7.4/2003, 
3.4/2004, 5.4 /2005, 6.9/2006, 7.3/2007, 13.1/2008, 16.7/2009, 15.8 
/2010, and 12.8/2011. This is but an indication of the deteriorating and 
inefficient regulatory frameworks to bring investments into Iraq. 183 
2. Government Effectiveness Index 
This index develops perceptions on the efficiency of public 
services and civil service and the degree of independence of the latter 
from political pressures. It also analyzes the sound mechanisms used for 
government policy development and enforcement, as well as the 
credibility of the government in terms of realizing these policies. 184 Iraq 
180. Id. 
181. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) Project, WORLD BANK GRP., 
available at http://info.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/index.aspx#home (last visited Oct. 
30, 2013). 
182. Regulatory Quality, WORLD BANK GRP., available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/ govemance/wgi/pdf/rq. pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). 
183. Worldwide Governance Indicators: Iraq Index, WORLD BANK GRP. (2012), 
available at http://info.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/index.aspx#reports (last visited Sept. 
16, 2013) [hereinafter Iraq Index]. 
184. Government Effectiveness, WORLD BANK GRP., available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/pdf/ge.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). 
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has secured low ratings in this respect: 1.5\2003, 2.0\2004, 1.0\2005, 
0.5\2006, 2.9\2007, 8.7\ 2008, 9.1 \2009 & 2010, 10.4\ 2011. 185 
These ratings indicate the inefficiency of the Iraqi Government's 
administrative performance. This is no surprise considering the 
conditions of the Baath Government till its toppling by the Coalition 
Forces in 2003. Despite the little improvements made since 2007, the 
ratings remain below the investors' expectations. 
3. Index of Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
This index measures the perceptions of potential instability, such 
as potential government instability or toppling by unconstitutional 
means, and violent cases with political and terroristic motives. 186 
Iraq had very low ratings from 2003 to 2011: 0.5/2003, 0.0/2004, 
0.5/2005, 0.0/2006, 0.5/2007, 1.4/2008, 2.4/2009, 1.9/2010, 3.8/2011. 187 
These ratings reveal the country's unstable political situation and higher 
waves of violence and terrorism. Therefore, efforts must be exerted to 
alleviate political rifts and enshrine national interests for a better 
political reality, which is currently experiencing moderate improvement. 
4. Rule of Law Index 
This index evaluates the confidence of the parties working with the 
state in terms of the latter's commitment to sound legal practices as per 
the rule of law principle, especially as it relates to contract enforcement, 
property rights, police, and courts, while ensuring such parties have 
necessary protection against arbitrary orders or decisions in individual 
cases. 188 Iraq ranked low on this index between 2003 to 2011: 2.9/2003, 
0.5/2004 & 2005, 1.0/2006 to 2008, 1.4/2009, 1.9/2010, and 
2.3/2011. 189 These figures prove the lack of state prestige and omission 
on the part of public authorities to enforce applicable laws with equality 
and observation of realities in Iraq. Therefore, foreign investors may be 
dubious about the efficiency and enforceability of legal rules and 
regulations in the countries they intend to invest. 
In a nutshell, and as suggested by these indices, the investment 
185. Iraq Index, supra note 183. 
186. Political Stability and the Absence of Violence/Terrorism, WORLD BANK GRP., 
available at http://info.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/pdf/pv.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 
2013). 
187. Iraq Index, supra note 183. 
188. Rule of Law, WORLDWIDE GOVERNANCE INDICATORS, available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/govemance/wgi/pdf/rl.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). 
189. Iraq Index, supra note 183. 
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environment in Iraq has consistently secured low rating despite 
moderate improvement in some of these rankings during different 
periods. However, improvements have not been made to the extent that 
enables the recovery of Iraqi investment environment. In contrast, Iraq 
still lacks a sound, healthy, and competitive environment, which would 
attract foreign investors. Therefore, a clear investment promotion 
strategy coupled with boosting the recent approaches adopted over the 
years that have shown the best index ratings for Iraq must be adopted. 
VI. ROADMAP: RECOMMENDATIONS THAT SHOULD 
BE ADOPTED 
There is no "silver bullet" for foreign investor aversion to Iraq. 
Nevertheless, there are certain reforms that may well alleviate foreign 
investors' concerns and establish a sustainable investment friendly 
environment. 
The general reform framework is all about introducing 
constitutional amendments, combating terror under a rule-of-law 
approach adopted by a strong and transparent (both centrally and 
locally) government, and introducing incentive and guarantee-based 
pro-foreign investment legislation. 
A. Address Inherent Determinants 
By showing that the Iraqi Government's strategy did not 
effectively address these challenges, this subsection highlights the 
importance of creating a safe environment for foreign investors and 
dealing with the risks encountered by these investors Iraq by addressing 
the country's security and political challenges, need for institutional 
reform by governance, and modernization of investment environment 
laws. 
1. Constitutional Revision 
Constitutional revision of power distribution between the central 
government and Kurdistan Province on one hand and the central 
government and other non-provincial governorates on the other190 is the 
190. The Iraqi Constitution adopted a federal system for dealing with the Kurdistan 
Province. Sabah Al-Bawi, Influences of Ambiguity of Constitutional Provisions on the 
Administrative System of Iraq, 33 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 1165, 1165 (2012). This system applies 
decentralized administration when it comes to the central government non-provincial 
govemorate relationship. Id. Constitutional provisions are so unclear that several disputes 
erupted across various fields, casting shadows on foreign investment companies. Id. 
Furthermore, foreign investments that entered into oil contracts with the Kurdistan Province 
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starting point for constitutional reform. Despite the current 
decentralized administration of govemorates, the current administrative 
structures adopt an unsteady approach toward Kurdistan, but a strong 
approach toward other govemorates. Federalism and decentralized 
administration have not been enforced effectively in the modem sense 
of the concept, while public govemorate-based directories are nothing 
short of "seconded" circuits of various centralized ministries. 191 
A reformist paper about the decentralization policy must address 
the administrative and structural organization at the province level, in 
the Kurdistan Province, in non-provincial govemorates, roles and 
responsibilities at each level, mobilization and allocation of resources, 
institutional development, and capacity building. A reformist paper 
must be based on a comprehensive survey of all existing laws and 
practices that could be developed through consultative measures 
adopted in conjunction with the concerned parties. 
The conflict of federal, provincial, and govemorate laws that are 
not clearly regulated by the Constitution is a major obstacle to foreign 
investments in Iraq. Therefore, amending Article 115 of the Iraqi 
Constitution 192 is a key issue because the Article prioritizes the Province 
Law in reference to the distribution of powers in the event of a dispute 
with the federal government. In contrast, other specific Articles refer to 
the federal law as the dominating law when applied to cases of dispute 
between provincial or govemorate laws. Surely, this trend is compatible 
with sound legal logic. 
The other suggestion is amending Article 122.5 of the Iraqi 
Constitution, which allows Provincial Councils to disobey the laws of 
the central legislature. Paragraph 2 of this Article gives govemorates 
large administrative and financial powers, but relevant laws do not 
identify such large powers. Accordingly, the provision results in a 
dispute between the central government, which is annoyed by the 
concept of powers, and the govemorates, which demand an expanding 
have been penalized by the Iraqi Federal Government, which deems any contract it does not 
control as invalid. See id. 
191. See Michael J. Kelly, The Kurdish Regional Constitution Within the Framework 
of the Iraqi Federal Constitution: A Struggle for Sovereignty, Oil, Ethnic Identity, and the 
Prospects for a Reverse Supremacy Clause, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 707 (2010). 
192. See Article 115, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic 
of Iraq] of 2005, which reads: "All powers not stipulated in the exclusive powers of the 
federal government belong to the authorities of the regions and governorates that are not 
organized in a region. With regard to other powers shared between the federal government 
and the regional government, priority shall be given to the law of the regions and 
governorates not organized in a region in case of dispute." 
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interpretation. 193 
Such disputes and conflicts have been a stumbling block to 
establishing a healthy foreign investment environment, even leading 
foreign investors to lose confidence in Iraqi laws. Penalties have been 
imposed on foreign companies owing to their agreements with 
Kurdistan without the consent of the federal government. These 
penalties have caused a hostile atmosphere between provincial councils 
and Kurdistan on one hand and the central ministries on the other. 
Establishing a successful system for the distribution of wealth in 
Iraq requires a clear interpretation of Articles 111 and 112 of the Iraqi 
Constitution194 up to enactment of the Oil & Gas Law. As a consequent 
step, the central government is required to develop and enforce 
transparency and accountability systems that ensure a better exploitation 
of resources out of decentralization; otherwise, state-driven anti-red-
tape efforts will grow more costly, with more chances for wider-scale 
corruption. The central government can play a key role in formulating 
public policies to attract investors, controlling the public, evaluating 
institutions that are in direct contact with investors, and supervising the 
decentralized opportunities available for investment. 
Promoting a pro-foreign-investment culture in local, closed 
communities is an essential effort that must involve better legal 
awareness of foreign properties. The federal government can contribute 
to the benefits of foreign investments. Furthermore, the social role of 
the government and civil society organizations may be evident in 
managing the means of contact with foreign investors and local 
communities to break the psychological barriers that form a part of the 
legacy of the colonization era further awakened by the 2003 occupation 
oflraq. 
2. Strengthening Anti-Terrorism Efforts 
Boosting security stability is a key cornerstone to building an 
investment attracting environment. As far as decade long terrorism 
stricken Iraq is concerned, efforts of combating terrorism require the 
following: 
193. Al-Bawi, supra note 190, at 1167. 
194. The Government of the Kurdistan Province insists on the "existing field" phrase 
in Article 112, which provides for the control of oil and gas matters by the oil-producing 
provincial and governorate governments. This means that newly discovered fields will be 
controlled directly by the relevant province and/or governorate. The Central Government, in 
turn, insists on Article 111 of the Constitution, which reads, "Oil and gas are owned by all 
the people oflraq in all the regions and govemorates." See id. at 1168. 
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a. Combating Terrorism Financing 
The government should consider adopting new legislation on 
confiscation of assets, money-laundering, and combating terrorism 
financing with a view to allowing more room for law enforcement that 
hinders financing terrorism and organized crime. 
b. Fighting Terrorism According to the Rule of Law 
Iraq's anti-terrorism efforts should move ahead while focusing on 
the rule of law by litigating imprisoned terrorists using the applicable 
Iraqi laws. The government should ensure joint responsibility of all 
bodies concerned with enforcing applicable laws while moving ahead 
with the capacity building of key government bodies and officials to 
combat terror and international organized crime per existing laws. 
Furthermore, the government is required to work with the international 
community to update the laws and tools used to stand against fast-
growing criminal and terrorist networks. 
It is essential to exert tremendous effort to enforce court orders and 
judgments and step up cooperation between the judiciary and Judgment 
Enforcement Office of the Ministries of Justice and Interior. The 
unending prison breaks by terrorism condemned inmates must be 
stopped. Government officials should honor final judgments through 
improved administrative and criminal mechanisms. 
c. Cooperating Widely in Counter-Terrorism Efforts 
The government should expand its cooperative efforts across its 
federal, provincial, and local system of government to combat terrorism, 
whether Iraq-based or otherwise. Careful exchanges of information 
between several government bodies, along with ensuring joint but 
carefully distributed roles and procedures between local anti-terrorism 
departments and all federal security agencies is the best means of 
combating major threats. 
3. Combating Corruption Flu 
Several agencies such as the Commission of Integrity, 195 the 
195. A key anti-corruption body was established by Decree No. 55 of 2004, which was 
issued by the Interim Coalition Authority. About CO!, COMM'N OF INTEGRITY, available at 
http://www.nazaha.iq/en_news2.asp?page_namper=e2 (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). A key 
distinctive feature of this body is its independence from governmental and parliamentary 
supervision. Id. The body was established to enforce the country's anti-corruption laws, 
public service standards, and conduct social awareness campaigns that add to stronger 
demands for transparent and accountable, clean leadership. Id. 
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Inspector General, 196 and the Board of Supreme Audit 197 assume the 
burden of combating corruption in Iraq. The growing corruption rates in 
Iraq are due to the double-control, balance, and law enforcement 
standards, with actions of the judiciary and parliamentary powers also 
being in a similar position. All the abovementioned bodies have been 
pressured to achieve certain results and have hence caused damage to 
the overall anti-corruption system. There are key procedures that should 
be established by the government for effectively combating corruption. 
a. Strengthening Anti-Corruption Institutions 
Effective leadership for any agency or organization is determined 
by the employment authority. In Iraq, integrity bodies still need to boost 
the appointment of Commission of Integrity employees and public 
inspectors by the House of Representatives, as provided for in relevant 
law, by moving away from the political quota-based trend. Filling future 
vacancies by means of the random choice of public inspectors by 
supervising bodies (such as the best employees of the Board of Supreme 
Audit) would be a means of ensuring fair appointments. The same 
applies to the Central Bank of Iraq and Office for Reporting Money 
Laundering. Moreover, procedures and measures requmng 
determination of beneficiary owners to prevent and disclose transfers of 
criminal revenues should be legislatively endorsed. 198 Furthermore, 
there is an urgent need to activate and build the capacities of the Office 
for Reporting Money Laundering of the Central Bank of Iraq and 
develop new systems to settle conflicts of interest between the integrity 
officers. 
b. Improving Accountability 
Better accountability practices require the adoption of a group of 
measures, such as annual submission of financial statements to the 
Board of Supreme Audit and House of Representatives, regulating 
196. This office was established by Decree No. 57 of 2004. MINISTRY OF OIL, 
available at http://www.oil.gov.iq/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). It is charged with 
conducting reviews and audits of and investigations into ministerial works to check for any 
abuses of power and violations of laws governing public service. Id. 
197. The oldest controlling institution as it dates back to 1927 as per Law No. 17. 
Board's Law, Bo. OF SUP. AUDIT (2013), available at http://www.d-raqaba-
m.iq/pages_en/about_law_e.aspx (last visited Oct. 30, 2013). Formerly the Public Audit 
Office, it aims at conducting financial auditing to check corruption, fraud, and misuse of 
public funds for the purposes of disbursement and use. Id. 
197 United Nations Convention against Corruptoin art. 52, Oct. 31, 2003, U.N. Doc. 
A/58/422. 
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disclosures of income and ensuring submission to the Commission of 
Integrity, including capacity building to use such disclosures to expose 
corruption, and developing integrity, accountability, and control 
capacities of parliament members and governorate board members, 
particularly in major fields such as oil and gas, public finance, public 
expenditure constraints, corruption, and law enforcement. Similarly, the 
containment of political influence to weaken the control and influence 
of government employees is required. Financing political parties and 
disclosure of sources thereof should be regulated. The enforcement of 
effective anti-corruption measures at supreme levels (including 
imprisonment sentences commensurate with relevant crimes), 
prevention of criminal revenues from falling into the hands of corrupt 
persons, and development and enforcement of long-term capacity-
building programs for combating the corrupt practices of government 
officials at all levels of civil service are required. In addition, 
government capacity should be enhanced to combat corruption and 
nepotism through the promotion of a professional civil service that 
adopts transparent policies of human resources management, including 
the existing efficiency-based systems and clarifying the role of the 
applicable Code of Conduct. Iraq needs sustained assistance to establish 
an anti-money-laundering system in order to detect, investigate, freeze, 
confiscate, and return lost assets and to immediately boost initial legal 
cooperation with neighboring countries and countries further from its 
borders. Other steps include combating money laundering by enacting 
appropriate legislation, supporting strong capacity building efforts for 
the Office for Reporting Money Laundering, and establishing a 
monetary intelligence unit with the Central Bank of Iraq under strong 
and independent leadership. These steps should be followed by a list of 
public officials to be monitored and developed in this respect. Finally, 
control, monitoring, and supervisory bodies need a better level of inter-
coordination, especially between the Board of Supreme Audit and 
Commission of Integrity. 
c. Complying With International Commitments 
Despite approving the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption by virtue of Law No. 35 of 2007, Iraqi legislators are 
required to adopt all necessary measures to ensure effective 
enforcement of the said Convention and observe the provisions thereof 
in all laws enacted thereby. To achieve this goal, it is time to approve 
Article 12 of the Convention, which regulates mechanisms of control, 
supervision, and accountability adopted by the State in cooperation with 
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the private sector. Furthermore, working on harmonizing internal codes 
of conduct for public servants and internationally and regionally 
approved rules is a must. Other measures Iraq needs to undertake 
include international cooperation to combat money laundering crimes 
and coordinate efforts for the same, approval of the principle of 
exchangeable international judicial assistance and international 
cooperation in criminal and civil fields, and confiscation of corruption-
generated revenues and returning the same to the country of origin. 
Finally, electronic means for detecting and following up on corruption 
and cross-border corruption-generated revenues must be implemented. 
4. Rehabilitation of Infrastructure 
The Iraqi Government should take up achieving good economic 
growth ratings as a key priority, an endeavor that requires a 
comprehensive and advanced program to develop and enhance the 
existing infrastructure. The major challenge to this program is the 
electricity sector because securing current and future electricity needs 
by the most cost-efficient means is inevitable to push forward the 
country's economic growth and reduce production costs. 
To upgrade the infrastructure in Iraq, the government should 
establish a supreme council for the reconstruction of infrastructure with 
the mission of planning, overseeing, and coordinating efforts of the 
concerned ministries in accordance with an explicit future vision. The 
proposed council needs specialist management in the field of 
infrastructure and economy. Further, the Iraqi infrastructure database 
should have complete and continuously up-to-date data. In addition, 
there must be a specialist bank concerned primarily with financing 
various infrastructure projects for low interest rate loans while seeking 
to manage such loans in a manner that secures necessary liquidity for 
infrastructure service projects without compromising the development 
of such services on the grounds of lack of necessary liquidity. 
Meanwhile, there must be deliberate and constant endeavors to 
encourage infrastructure-based investments in accordance with modem 
finance schemes such as concession and management contracts, which 
secure private sector involvement by realizing double digit return 
ratings in return for provision of quality services and maintenance for 
such projects. Unequivocally, this requires a competitive approach, 
private sector involvement, fewer restrictions to these markets, and 
regulation of the same as per market economy rules. 
48
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 41, No. 1 [2013], Art. 5
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol41/iss1/5
2013] Cakes Without Sugar 193 
B. Reform of the Legal Framework 
The purpose of this subsection is to seek the relevant benefits and 
offer them in the form of a "guiding manual" for the Iraqi Government 
for use in order to handle its investment-environment problems, mainly 
by amending and modernizing investment environment laws. 
1. Activation of Protection of Intellectual Property 
At the center of the reform efforts is the establishment of effective 
institutions to deter violations against intellectual property rights, which 
should begin in conjunction with the launch of a public awareness 
campaign to respect these rights. In a related development, unifying the 
rules of property rights scattered in several laws under a single law is 
also necessary. Likewise, legal wording contained in the legislation of 
property rights should be clear and not allow for more than one 
interpretation. Additionally, the country's intellectual property laws 
should be identical to the provisions of the TRIPS agreement. These 
reforms as well as their role in the protection of intellectual property 
will lead to the acceleration oflraq's accession to the WTO. 
2. Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards 
The Iraqi Investment Law allows for national arbitration as per 
Iraqi laws or international arbitration through referral to any 
internationally recognized arbitration body, as provided for under 
Article 27/4. 199 However, this Article is inconsistent with provisions of 
the Law on Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Iraq No. 30 of 1928 
because it does not include any provision for enforcing foreign 
arbitration judgments in Iraq. Furthermore, Article 1 of the aforesaid 
law requires that for a foreign judgment to be enforced in Iraq, it needs 
to be issued by a foreign competent court formed outside Iraq. 200 
As long as there is no law allowing for the enforcement of foreign 
judgments, Article 27/4 of the Iraqi Investment Law is futile. This is 
further complicated by the fact that Iraq is not a party to international 
conventions on arbitration. Consequently, as a procedural guarantee for 
settlement of investment disputes, efficient arbitration is up to standard 
199. National Investment Law [NIL] art. 27 (2007), available at 
http://trade.gov/static/iraq_investmentlaw.pdf. "If one of the parties to a dispute is subject 
to the provisions of this law, they may, at the time of signing the agreement, agree on a 
mechanism to resolve disputes including arbitration pursuant to the Iraqi law or any other 
internationally recognized entity." Id. 
200. Haddad, supra note 104. 
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in Iraqi legislation. Therefore, this paper proposes amendment of Law 
No. 30 on Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Iraq of 1928 in order to 
provide for enforcement of arbitration judgments as per the terms and 
conditions required thereof. 
The above analysis clarifies that the enforcement mechanism of 
foreign arbitration decisions has terminated all efforts exerted to 
identify or develop effective settlement mechanisms for foreign 
investment disputes in Iraq. Therefore, signing the Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York 
1958, has become inevitable because arbitration clauses in foreign 
contracts require enforcement of arbitration awards. This shall become a 
reality only by joining the said Convention, entering into bilateral 
international agreements, or enactment of a new Iraqi arbitration law. 
3. Promote Judiciary Independence and Capabilities 
Iraqi courts are key players in investment dispute settlements. 
Accordingly, it is imperative for the courts to have the power to deal 
with foreign investment contracts. This shall be a key milestone to back 
up upgrading capacities and establishing judicial independence and 
security. 
a. Boosting Judicial Independence 
In seeking an independent judiciary, there is a dire need to provide 
a sufficient number of judges and judicial courts to boost the course of 
civil and commercial proceedings. Through judicial education and 
capacity building, the SJC will be able to maintain high professional 
standards for new judges. The much sought after independent judicial 
system can be shielded from political influence by enforcing laws that 
provide immunity to the judiciary. In addition, a relevant suggestion is 
making more information and statistics regarding cases available to the 
general public in order to spread awareness on legal culture and judicial 
transparency. 
b. Upgrading Judicial Capacities 
Judicial newcomers' capacities must be built alongside efforts to 
educate current judges through systemic training, continuous learning, 
and updating relevant curricula. The Judicial Development Institute 
assumes a key role in such continuous learning efforts. Long-term 
activities can be technologically updated along with state-of-the-art 
means of reviewing and presenting cases. Advanced training for the 
judiciary in commercial and civil laws, as well as effective use of the 
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commercial structure of cases and handing down judgments are among 
areas of desired development. Additionally, commercial and civil legal 
proceedings must be upgraded to promote a scientific and technical 
court environment. Systemic reviews and continuous improvements in 
enforcement of judgments ( especially foreign arbitration judgments) 
and court orders will contribute to better judicial capacities. 
c. Enhancing Judicial Security 
Judicial reforms in Iraq require short-term consideration of the 
joint responsibility of the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) and the 
Ministry of Interior (MoI) for judicial security. This objective is 
attainable via a judicial security place clarifying the Mol's or SJC's 
responsibility for judicial security. This plan shall cover details of 
personal security, court security, and safe and secure houses for judges. 
C. Reorganization of the Investment Framework 
This measure aims to determine rehabilitation mechanisms of the 
investment framework-an objective achievable by discussing available 
solutions and recommending rectification of defects in the overall 
investment process. 
1. Activating the Role of Investment Commissions 
The key suggestion for a reformist plan starts with the initiation of 
a comprehensive scheme concerning the Law of Civil Service and 
Public Administration. This scheme should enhance the links between 
civil service and administrative reforms, enhance public finance 
management, and build provincial capacities to provide non-central 
services. 
Reforms of the Law of Civil Service should adopt the key values 
of modem management, namely efficiency-based appointments; 
performance assessments and evaluations; successful planning; role 
determination; delineation of responsibilities and relationships between 
civil servants, ministers, and other elected officials; and codification of 
ethical values and standards for the benefit of the society. In addition, 
there is a need to establish secondary legislation to strengthen the civil 
service compliance framework and links between civil service and 
administrative reforms. 
In a nutshell, Iraq needs to establish integrated e-govemance to 
wipe out forms of financial and administrative corruption and provide 
services ( absent red tape) to investors through state-of-the-art e-portals 
across public institutions. 
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This study suggests entrusting the Ministry of Finance with 
obtaining approvals from the ministries and government bodies in the 
course of any potential investments. This is because the Ministry of 
Finance owns all public lands that are not allotted to other ministries or 
bodies. Thus, the Ministry of Finance is supposedly responsible for the 
determination of all land available for investments, contacting other 
ministries to ensure that these are free of current or proposed activities 
by such ministries, and establishing the viability of introducing 
investments thereto. This suggestion ensures full knowledge and 
determination of the lots available for investment and thus enhances 
investment planning and promotion. Another benefit is minimizing the 
red tape associated with obtaining a host of ministerial approvals. 
2. Removal of Bureaucratic Obstacles 
For addressing institutional obstacles, it is hereby suggested to 
introduce a "Liaison Department" to serve as a linking point between 
the NIC and other ministries and bodies concerned, for better 
understanding and coordination. The suggested structure of such 
Liaison Department is based on assigning the management thereof to 
the NIC, with deputy ministers accounting for other members. 
Ministries that are directly concerned, such as the Ministries of Finance, 
Planning, Housing and Construction, and Industry, should be introduced 
as members of the suggested Department along with other members 
belonging to the ministries and bodies as needed in a manner 
commensurate with their roles in support investment projects. 
3. Developing the Iraqi Financial Market 
There are a number of key recommendations to enhance the Iraqi 
financial market, the most significant among which is increasing 
cooperation opportunities between Iraqi financial market components in 
terms of their respective services and amending the existing financial 
and banking legislations that regulate and control operations of non-
banking economic institutions to ensure compatibility with market-
driven economy requirements, develop performance among such 
institutions, use e-systems to run their work, and ensure sufficient legal 
guarantees to win investors' trust. Relevantly, an extensive durable 
database must be created for public entities in the Iraqi financial market 
to enable decision makers to make objective decisions regarding entities 
working therein. Another key step is providing a non-banking financial 
entity friendly investment climate by encouraging the creation of 
market-making compames, investment guarantors, and finance 
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companies, including small and medium loan companies. Further, banks 
and companies must be encouraged to issue bonds allowed under 
Companies Law No. 21 of 1997, as doing so is a key tool to increasing 
capital and developing investment awareness of good revenues. 
Working on developing clear mechanisms and directives to transform 
the central Iraqi economy to a market-driven economy adds up to taking 
the aforementioned steps. These actions would help dispel the 
ambiguities, difficulties, and gaps posed by such transformation during 
the transitional period. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In today's critical stage of Iraq's modem history, efforts to attract 
foreign investors are underway. Foreign investors have always been 
reluctant to break into this harsh investment environment given its 
particularities, such as the military force driven transformation from a 
dictatorship to a democracy and the transformation from a socialist to a 
liberal system of government. This has resulted in Iraq's inability to 
apply democratic ways of government and its fragile relationship with 
liberalism, which hinders its financial and economic openness with the 
rest of the world widely. Further, the current socialist laws of commerce 
and economy are still in force alongside new liberal laws, thus leading 
to a conflict between laws meant to regulate the same aspects of an 
action. 
Analytically speaking, this article has revealed the seriousness of 
the risks of investing in Iraq to foreign investors. In addition, this article 
spots the key obstacles in the Iraqi investment environment and 
provides suggestions for Iraqi legislators and government for the 
development and enhancement the investment environment. This 
conclusion requires further legislation tantamount to the International 
Investment Law in addition to ratification of relevant international 
conventions and consideration of the conclusion of more bilateral 
investment agreements; these measures would send positive messages 
about the seriousness of the incentives and legal guarantees for foreign 
investments in Iraq. Equally important is an appropriate consideration 
of the challenges being faced by the concerned investment authorities 
and public service bodies, as these may affect the efforts to enhance 
Iraq's worldwide rank in foreign investment. To a large extent, codes of 
shielding investment authorities against political influences should be 
adopted. Meanwhile, initiatives developed by investment authorities to 
attract foreign investors must be provided with political support. 
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